nationalgrid


Stage 06: Final CUSC Modification Report

Connection and Use of System Code (CUSC)

CMP201 Removal of BSUoS Charges from Generation

Consultation Responses

What stage is this document at?



Published on:

9 May 2013

About this document

This document contains the responses to the Workgroup Consultation which took place between 29 February 2012 and 28 March 2012 and the second Code Administrator Consultation which took place between 26 February 2013 and 19 March 2013. The responses to the first Code Administrator Consultation can be found in Volume 2 of the first Final Report.¹

Document Control

Version	Date	Author	Change Reference
3.0	21 March	Code Administrator	Second Draft CUSC
	2013		Modification Report for
			industry comment
3.1	18 April 2013	Code Administrator	For Panel Vote
4.0	9 May 2013	Code Administrator	Version for Submission to
			Authority



Any Questions? Contact: Emma Clark National Grid Code Administrator





Proposer: **lain Pielage** National Grid Electricity Transmission plc

¹ The responses can be found here: <u>http://www.nationalgrid.com/NR/rdonlyres/B94D6062-097C-</u> <u>465C-B8DF-7139932F8BED/56924/CMP201FinalModReportVolume2Responses.pdf</u>

Respondent: Sarah Owen 01753 431052 **Company Name:** The Centrica Group of companies excluding Centrica Storage Ltd. Please express your views We do not support the implementation of this modification. We regarding the Workgroup suggest that if this modification was to be implemented, end Consultation, including rationale. users within Great Britain would be adversely impacted by around £150m per annum (analysis undertaken by National (Please include any issues, Grid). Although the wholesale power price should reduce to suggestions or queries) exclude BSUoS charging to generators, the corresponding increase in flows across interconnectors would increase the power price resulting in a negative impact to GB end consumers. In light of this, we believe National Grid should consider withdrawing this modification as the original proposal was premised on the basis that there would be no adverse impacts on GB consumers. Additionally, this change will bring additional risk to suppliers due to the inherent volatility of BSUoS. We suggest this increase in risk is greater than the decrease in risk to generators (from no longer having to pay BSUoS), as generators are generally the beneficiaries of increased spending (implied by increased BSUoS). Furthermore, this proposal results in a dis-connect between the industry players that are subject to RCRC and BSUoS charges, Therefore, we believe the proposal is flawed and should not be adopted in its current form. We do not agree that a future change to the charging or cash out arrangements should be left to be considered as part of Ofgem's cash out review. Any potential disconnect should be resolved as part of this modification proposal. Notwithstanding, if this modification is accepted, we suggest that a time delay of at least two years before implementation is adopted to prevent windfall gains or losses. Windfall losses will occur if this is modification is implemented ahead of this two year period, as Suppliers hedge out their position and also offer fixed priced deals to consumers. In these situations, the Supplier would incur the increase in BSUoS charges but would be unable to pass this on, impacting margins which may already be very low. If a sufficient delay of at least two years is given, most of these contracts and hedges will have lapsed and new contracts can be negotiated with the relevant charges duly considered.

Do you believe that the proposed original or any of the alternatives better facilitate the Applicable CUSC Objectives? Please include your reasoning.	We do not believe that this modification betters any of the relevant objectives. We suggest that the detrimental impact to GB end consumers negates any positive impacts to GB generators. We believe that the proposal potentially has a detrimental impact on Applicable CUSC Objective (a) as the increased BSUoS risk will adversely affect competition in supply, as smaller suppliers are less able to manage uncertain cash-flows. We would note that this means Applicable CUSC Objective (c) may not be relevant as it is required to be consistent with Objectives (a) & (b). i.e. better facilitation cannot be considered if in conflict with either of the other objectives,
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Do you support the proposed implementation approach? If not, please state why and provide an alternative suggestion where possible.	As stated above, we suggest that there should be at least a two year implementation delay to ensure that no parties incur windfall losses or gains. We do not support a phased approach as we consider this would complicate and add further risk to an already unpredictable charge and could impact system costs of implementation.
Do you have any other comments?	
Do you wish to raise a Workgroup Consultation Alternative Request for the Workgroup to consider?	If yes, please complete a Workgroup Consultation Alternative Request form, available on National Grid's website, and return to the above email address with your completed Workgroup Consultation response proforma.

Q	Question	Response
1	Do you have any views on how the risk from CMP201 can be quantified?	We suggest that further investigation could be undertaken by Ofgem as part of their impact assessments for this modification proposal.
2	What are your views on the credit risk on Suppliers, either i) the under-securing of BSUoS for a short period following implementation of CMP201; (should special changes be made to ameliorate this time- limited risk, or is it bearable); and ii) the enduring increase?	We suggest that if this modification is implemented, there will need to be a temporary change to the volume of credit posted to ensure that sufficient credit cover is posted. If this is not achieved then the Supplier community will become liable for this uncovered risk, should a liable party default.

Q	Question	Response
3	Do you have any	No.
	conflicting information or	
	understandings as to how	
	other EU Member States	
	charge for BSUoS?	
4	Are there any further pros	Within Table 1, a con should be added to end consumers as
	or cons that should be	they will incur additional costs for their power. The analysis of
	highlighted in the	this was included in a report by National Grid.
	assessment and if so, how	
	they might be	
	demonstrated / quantified?	
5	Do you have any	We suggest that the dis-connect between RCRC and BSUOS
	additional views on the	should be addressed under this modification or a linked modification should be raised. We do not agree that a future
	issue of BSUoS and RCRC	change to the charging or cash out arrangements should be
	interaction in the context	left to be considered as part of Ofgem's cash out review. As a
	of this proposal, and if so,	minimum, guidance should be sought as to whether this
	any proposals for how it	proposal is capable of being approved.
	can be addressed?	
6	Will the proposed change	No.
	have any impact on User	
	IS systems, please provide	
	details, timing and likely	
	costs?	

Respondent:	Duncan Carter
	Duncan.carter@consumerfocus.org.uk
	020 7799 8041
Company Name:	Consumer Focus
Please express your views regarding the Workgroup Consultation, including rationale. (Please include any issues, suggestions or queries)	The working group have identified a number of risks from the implementation of CMP201 that must be carefully balanced with the potential benefits from the Mod. If it is unclear whether the Mod provides overall benefit then the presumption should be for the status quo to prevail as this represents the overall lowest risk and cost.
suggestions of queries)	While the Mod may offer some benefits in terms of meeting the likely future direction of EU energy policy, it is necessary to question whether now is the right time to consider this Mod, or whether deferral might represent a less risky option. Setting an arbitrary timeline for introducing a Mod that is contingent on as yet poorly defined EU policy seems unhelpful. The benefits from the Mod are premised on a successful, pan European liberalised energy market. We are some way from this being realised. Rather than implementing CMP201 now, it would be better to wait until a sufficient degree of maturity exists in the liberalisation of the European energy market to drive significant improvements in competition and consumer benefit.
	The UK's has one of the most liberalised energy markets in Europe and there is some evidence that consumers to date have benefited from this through energy prices that compare favourably with other member states. In many regards, the UK model is at the vanguard of European energy liberalisation. Many countries lag far behind the UK: the European Commission has recently issued statements urging eight countries to liberalise their energy market (Spain, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Slovakia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Romania and Slovenia) and to implement the measures necessary to transpose the third energy package into national legislation before 3 March this year. These measures include the separation of networks, the independence of national regulators and improvements in the operation of the retail markets; these are measures the UK has already realised.
	It will take some years before these countries have taken the important steps towards a liberalised energy market. Set in this context, CMP201 seems premature and peripheral to the fundamental changes that are still required in many EU member states before UK consumers will benefit from increased liberalisation in the European energy market.
	Furthermore, there is a risk that consumers will be subject to material disbenefit if generators do not pass on savings from BSUoS to suppliers. Despite a lack of transparency in transfer pricing and the role of trading arms, there is some evidence in

	the wholesale energy market that generators pass increases in wholesale energy costs quickly onto consumers, while they are slower to lower prices when wholesale prices fall, resulting in consumer detriment. In the absence of evidence to the contrary within the Working Group Consultation, it is reasonable to conclude that there is a high degree of risk that generators will not pass through savings from the removal of BSUoS to suppliers. In addition the risk of transitional windfall gains and losses, and the degree to which these can be mitigated by delaying the implementation of CMP201, provides further reason to postpone its implementation.
Do you believe that the	For reference, the Applicable CUSC Objectives are:
proposed original or any of the alternatives better facilitate the Applicable CUSC Objectives? Please include your reasoning.	(a) that compliance with the use of system charging methodology facilitates effective competition in the generation and supply of electricity and (so far as is consistent therewith) facilitates competition in the sale, distribution and purchase of electricity;
your reasoning.	The proposal is likely to adversely impact upon ability of new suppliers to enter the market (4.12). This is not currently offset by the possible future and as yet unquantified advantages from a pan European liberalised energy market. At this time the impact of CMP201 on competition in the UK electricity market is likely to be negative.
	CMP201 will increase a Suppliers credit holding requirement (4.30). This is likely to make it harder for new entrants to enter the market. ENTSO-E's cited paper suggests that in Europe most TSOs charge network operators' charges to Demand/Load. Ignoring the acknowledged difficulties in comparing network charges across Europe for the time being, we think the greatest impact of EU on the UK electricity market in the short to medium term will be from counties with interconnects, or planned interconnects, with the UK.
	The UK has interconnects with France, Northern Ireland, Ireland, Netherlands and Belgium with planned interconnects with <u>Norway</u> . The G:D split is 2:98; 25:75; 25:75; 0:100; 0:100 respectively. Thus a move to 100% BSUoS on Demand in the UK would have the immediate effect of <i>decreasing</i> harmonisation, the short to medium term at least, with those countries the UK is interconnected – or likely to interconnect with.
	(b) that compliance with the use of system charging methodology results in charges which reflect, as far as is reasonably practicable, the costs (excluding any payments between transmission licensees which are made under and in accordance with the STC) incurred by transmission licensees in their transmission businesses and which are compatible with standard condition C26 (Requirements of a connect and manage

connection);
It also likely that the risk from BSUoS variability are asymmetrical and Generators are better able to manage the risk; the market will work most effectively when those who are better able to manage risk are effectively rewarded or penalised. A transfer of BSUoS to demand thus seems likely to increase the total risk premium which will have a negative impact upon consumer bills.
(c) that, so far as is consistent with sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), the use of system charging methodology, as far as is reasonably practicable, properly takes account of the developments in transmission licensees' transmission businesses
Neutral

Do you support the proposed implementation approach? If not, please state why and provide an alternative suggestion where possible.	No. The proposal has merits when other member states are more advanced in liberalising their energy markets. At the moments, the UK is already "leading the pack". Going faster and further than other member states given the risks involved in implementation, both transitional windfalls and enduring risks.
	We suggest that CMP201 is postponed and reconsidered when other EU member states are more advanced in the liberalising of their energy markets. We would welcome the opinion of working group members on what might represent appropriate triggers.
	Furthermore there is a real risk of consumer detriment if generators do not pass BSUoS savings onto suppliers.
Do you have any other comments?	
Do you wish to raise a Workgroup Consultation Alternative Request for the Workgroup to consider?	If yes, please complete a Workgroup Consultation Alternative Request form, available on National Grid's website, and return to the above email address with your completed Workgroup Consultation response proforma.

	Q	Question	Response
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Q	Question	Response
1	Do you have any views on how the risk from CMP201 can be quantified?	We would welcome an assessment of the total annual value of the current BSUoS payments by generators. Figure 1 in the Working Group paper suggests this will be under £100m. This would help assess the materiality of the "worst case" scenario in which generators fail to pass on savings to wholesale market/suppliers. In this worst case, consumers could end up effectively "double paying" BSUoS charges. Under the proposals they would be paying 100% of BSUoS and could also be paying the 50% of BSUoS formerly paid by generators. An estimate of the size of transitional risk posed by existing contracts would also be helpful to further understand possible detriment.
2	What are your views on the credit risk on Suppliers, either i) the under-securing of BSUoS for a short period following implementation of CMP201; (should special changes be made to ameliorate this time- limited risk, or is it bearable); and ii) the enduring increase?	Greater competition in the supply market is vital for improving competition in the UK's energy market. CMP201 will increase barriers to entry by requiring increased credit holding. Smaller suppliers in particular already find it harder to secure credit at favourable rates than larger suppliers; CMP201 will further exacerbate this barrier to entry reducing competition in the energy market, contrary to condition (a) of the CUSC. We do not think this will be offset by the reduction in risk for smaller generators. Generators are better positioned to manage the BSUoS variability risk compared to suppliers. Generators are also naturally hedged for variability in BSUoS by other payments they receive eg constraint revenues. We do not accept the view in 4.19 that the wholesale electricity market is competitive and so generators cannot price the cost of constraints any more easily than suppliers. We agree with the Ofgem view that the competition in the electricity market requires improvement. Also iii) in 4.16 suggests that individual generators could not simply inflate the cost of services. Ofgem's recent consultation on Transmission Constraint Licence Conditions would suggest that some generators are able to inflate the cost of service.
3	Do you have any conflicting information or understandings as to how other EU Member States charge for BSUoS?	No comment.
4	Are there any further pros or cons that should be highlighted in the assessment and if so, how they might be demonstrated / quantified?	No comment.


Q	Question	Response
5	Do you have any additional views on the issue of BSUoS and RCRC interaction in the context of this proposal, and if so, any proposals for how it can be addressed?	No comment.
6	Will the proposed change have any impact on User IS systems, please provide details, timing and likely costs?	No comment.

Company Name: Drax Power Limited and Haven Power Limited Please express your views regarding the Workgroup Consultation, including rationale. The Problem (Please include any issues, suggestions or queries) The evidence presented to date suggests that the majority of European electricity markets place BSUOS (equivalent) charges exclusively on demand. As a result, the wholesate electricity price in these markets will not include the cost of balancing services. Consequently, GB generators are placed at a disadvantage when trading in other European markets via interconnectors when compared with equivalent generation (assuming generation costs are identical in each market). This is because GB generators must factor in BSUOS costs as part of their Short Run Marginal Cost. The Objective of the Modification We agree with the intentions underpinning CMP201. These are to: • facilitate efficient competition between European generators, which maximises allocative EU efficiency for the benefit of end consumers; and • be consistent with the spirit of the Third Package, i.e. facilitate cross-border trade. We believe CMP201 achieves these objectives, because it will better align GB Balancing Services charging arrangements with those prevalent in other EU Member States. By levying all BSUOS costs on demand, this will align the GB .generation stack" with those located in other European markets by removing the BSUOS element from generation prices offered to the market
regarding the Workgroup Consultation, including rationale.The evidence presented to date suggests that the majority of European electricity markets place BSUoS (equivalent) charges exclusively on demand. As a result, the wholesale electricity price in these markets will not include the cost of balancing services. Consequently, GB generators are placed at a disadvantage when trading in other European markets via interconnectors when compared with equivalent generation (assuming generation costs are identical in each market). This is because GB generators must factor in BSUoS costs as part of their Short Run Marginal Cost.The Objective of the Modification We agree with the intentions underpinning CMP201. These are to:• facilitate efficient competition between European generators, which maximises allocative EU efficiency for the benefit of end consumers; and • be consistent with the spirit of the Third Package, i.e. facilitate cross-border trade.We believe CMP201 achieves these objectives, because it will better align GB Balancing Services charging arrangements with those prevalent in other EU Member States. By levying all BSUoS costs on demand, this will align the GB "generation stack" with those located in other European markets by removing
 This change will provide a level playing field in the GB market and in those EU markets to which GB is interconnected. However, to achieve the benefits listed above CMP201 must be implemented alongside CMP202. Implementing both CMP201 and CMP202 as a package will: Facilitate efficient cross border trade, enhancing GB electricity market competition and security of supply, benefitting end consumers; Align the GB electricity market arrangements with those predominately operating in other European markets, thereby furthering the EU Third Package objective to implement a single EU electricity market; Remove the existing barrier to GB exports that occurs due to the differential in treatment of BSUOS (equivalent costs across European electricity markets (CMP202 on its own only partially removes this distortion); and Avoid subsiding electricity imports to GB from continenta Europe (this distortion will occur if CMP202 is implemented on its own).

imports will not be liable to equivalent balancing costs. This may result in "higher total cost" power being imported due to the different treatment of balancing costs across the value chain in
differing European Member States. This would result in the inefficient trade of wholesale electricity, which could be easily avoided by implementing CMP201 and CMP202 together.
BSUoS cost reductions and the wholesale power price
We agree that removing the 50% BSUoS share from generation will allow generators to offer lower wholesale electricity prices (net of the BSUoS element). In a competitive generation market, this will offset the corresponding increase in the BSUoS charge to suppliers. As such, retail electricity prices will not differ due to levying all BSUoS costs on suppliers (assuming adequate time is allowed to transition to the new arrangements). Any subsequent changes in retail prices will be related to changes in market fundamentals, e.g. changes in the balance of exports and imports.
A key measure of the competitiveness of markets is the level of market concentration. The primary measure of market concentration is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). The latest HHI data for the GB generation market (based on metered volume) available to us is for 20101. The Ofgem report indicates an HHI of 1,238 for the generation market. This is way below the threshold of >1,800 which indicates a highly concentrated market. This demonstrates that generators will have little scope to withhold the cost savings associated with lowering their BSUOS cost. As such any cost savings will filter through to retail prices.
Supplier tools to pass on BSUoS costs
We note that suppliers have a number of tools at their disposal to pass through any increase in BSUoS costs to their customers. These include: re-openers, specific pass through elements, contract renewals, etc.
To ensure that suppliers can reasonably pass through their increased BSUoS liability, it is important that reasonable time is provided to transition to the new arrangements. It is our understanding that the majority of customer contracts are set no longer than three years forward. Therefore a minimum three year notice period would best allow market participants to transition effectively. We discuss our views on transition in more detail below.
The risk premiums applied by generators and suppliers are the same
We believe that the risk premium generators and suppliers apply to BSUoS costs (due to the fact BSUoS charges are volatile and determined ex-post) are the same. Therefore, levying BSUoS 100% on demand will result in a transfer of risk rather than an increase or decrease in risk (which would either benefit or disadvantage end consumers).
It has been suggested in the Workgroup consultation that the risk premium applied by generators is lower relative to that applied by suppliers. It has been suggested that this is the case due to

generators receiving a proportion of constraint payments that can then use to hedge against BSUoS costs. This will then allow generators to levy a lower risk premium relative to a situation where they receive no BOA income. We do not believe this to be the case. This is primarily because generators cannot predict when and how much they will receive from BOA payments. In fact, some generators (for example nuclear power stations) are unlikely to receive any BOA income.

To illustrate how unpredictable BOA revenue for specific generators can be, we have produced data demonstrating the level of Offer revenue Drax Power Station has earned each year between 2004 and 2011. In addition, to illustrate the lack of correlation between the level of BSUoS and BOA income, the total BSUoS cost for generators between 2004 and 2011 is shown on the same graph.



The above graph shows that there are significant fluctuations in Offer revenue received year on year. Moreover there is a high point of approximately $\pounds 40m$ and low point of less than $\pounds 5m$. There is additionally, a large degree of income fluctuation within month as well as inter year.

Finally, even if it were the case that BOA income was steady and predictable (which it is not), there is no relationship between BSUoS fluctuations and the level of income received by specific generators. For example, the peak amount of Offer revenue in 2009 does not correspond with peak total BSUoS costs. Therefore, we do not believe that the achievement of BOA revenue can do used to hedge BSUoS costs.

BSUoS is a cost recovery mechanism

It has been suggested in the Workgroup Consultation that the removal of BSUoS charges from generation might dull signals provided to generators to operate efficiently. We do not believe this to be the case. BSUoS costs are not levied according to specific generator behaviour and it is levied ex post; as such, it is not useful as a signal to influence the behaviour of generators. Therefore placing all BSUoS costs on demand will not remove any signals encouraging generators to perform in an efficient

	manner. Rather, BSUoS is simply a cost recovery mechanism.
Do you believe that the proposed original or any of the alternatives better facilitate the Applicable CUSC Objectives? Please include your reasoning.	We believe that by implementing CMP201 and CMP202 as a package both modifications will better facilitate Applicable CUSC objectives (a) and (c). By removing all import and export distortions caused by levying 50% of BSUoS on generation, this will help create a level playing field between generators in the EU internal market for electricity. This will facilitate efficient cross border trade and benefit GB consumers in terms of fostering more competitive electricity prices. Thus Objective (a) is better facilitated.
	Objective (c) is better facilitated as implementing both modifications will better reflect the duties associated with National Grid"s business by promoting a single internal market in electricity which will promote efficient cross border trade (in line with the intent of the Third Package).

Do you support the proposed implementation approach? If	We agree that a reasonable length of time should be allowed for transition to ensure both generators and suppliers are able to
not, please state why and provide an alternative suggestion where possible.	take account of changes in their commercial agreements with each other and, in the case of suppliers, with end consumers. We believe that a three year transition period2 would allow adequate time to avoid any potential perverse outcomes and unintended consequences. This is due to the majority of fixed term contracts being three years or less in length. Therefore, when new contracts are negotiated, prices should reflect the new BSUoS charging arrangements. We note that discussion at Workgroup meetings suggests contracts that are longer than three years in length are likely to contain clauses that enable the pass-through of cost increases related to regulatory changes. Whilst we agree, these longer term contracts also represent a small minority of total customer contracts.
	In contrast we believe that a five year transition period would be disproportionate to the potential cost to suppliers. The benefits of CMP201 (and CMP202) should be realised in a reasonable timeframe. It is our view that the potential for perverse outcomes is almost eliminated with a three year notice period. Therefore, any risks beyond three years are unlikely to be material.
	For similar reasons, we do not think that CMP201 should only be allowed to take effect once all forward trading arrangements have been amended to clearly state whether or not BSUoS is included. In addition to unnecessarily delaying the benefits of the Modifications, we believe this suggestion could create a perverse incentive to set up a small number of very long term forward contracts which would frustrate the transition of CMP201.
	With regards to phasing, we believe that all the phased approaches detailed in the consultation document are overly complex and are likely to significantly increase the implementation costs associated with CMP201 whilst providing little additional benefit. Moving all BSUoS charges to demand in

	one step with a reasonable notice period (i.e. three years) is both a sensible and cost-effective approach. Finally, in the interests of ensuring consumers are well informed of the changes which might need to be made to their contracts, we can see some benefit in National Grid providing a short explanation letter to confirm when and why tariffs might change following the implementation of the Modification in the event of
	Ofgem approval. Moreover, we suggest that best practice would entail suppliers informing customers of any changes to their contracts well in advance to ensure consumer confidence in the market is maintained.
Do you have any other comments?	No.
Do you wish to raise a WG Consultation Alternative Request for the Workgroup to consider?	No. However, we encourage the Workgroup to consider a Workgroup Alternative which sets the transition time to three years as opposed to two or five years. This is because we understand that the majority of customer contracts do not extend beyond three years in duration. As such, a three year transition arrangement would best ensure that any perverse outcomes are avoided whilst allowing the benefits of the modification to be captured at the earliest opportunity. Moreover, a three year transition potentially provides a compromise between the two year and five year transition options.

Q	Question	Response
1	Do you have any views on how the risk from CMP201 can be quantified?	We are only aware of the methods discussed at the first two Workgroup meetings. We believe these provide a satisfactory quantification of the potential effects that CMP201 might cause.

Q	Question	Response
Q 2	Question What are your views on the credit risk on Suppliers, either i) the under-securing of BSUoS for a short period following implementation of CMP201; (should special changes be made to ameliorate this time- limited risk, or is it bearable); and ii) the enduring increase?	In the short term, we believe the increase will have a small impact on supplier's credit risk costs. We expect that the increased level of credit cover would be required to be in place prior to the implementation date. As such, National Grid should have oversight of any parties failing to post additional credit in good time. In such circumstances, National Grid may wish to warn parties of their potential to breach credit requirements if they fail to increase the level of credit posted. However, credit cover is one of the elements that smaller suppliers are wary of and any enduring increase that exposes the supplier to a larger credit risk can be challenging to manage. This would especially be the case for a new market entrant who would not have the benefit of a good payment history to offset some of the credit requirements and would need to lodge cash. There is also the issue that increased charges carry the risk of causing cash flow difficulties as the point at which the supplier pays (every 29 days) is different from the point at which suppliers can recover money from the customer – especially if they are quarterly billed. Whilst these already exist, the fact that the BSUoS charge will be doubled will exacerbate this issue.
		However, whilst noting these impacts we believe that provided adequate notice of changes is given to market participants (e.g. a three year transition), a prudent supplier will be able to manage these enduring impacts. Moreover, these impacts are outweighed by the benefits of the proposed modification.
3	Do you have any conflicting information or understandings as to how other EU Member States charge for BSUoS?	No. We believe that the evidence presented to the Workgroup represents a realistic assessment of the treatment of BSUoS (equivalent) costs in continental European electricity markets.

Q	Question	Response
4	Are there any further pros	No. We believe that all the relevant pros and cons have been
-	or cons that should be	captured.
	highlighted in the	
		We agree strongly with the following pros highlighted in the
	assessment and if so, how	Consultation document:
	they might be	There is the notantial for sumpliars to superionse
	demonstrated / quantified?	 There is the potential for suppliers to experience windfall losses "if implementation/transition is poorly managed". Moreover, sufficient time is required for changes to "be reflected in Supplier / Gen and Supplier / customer contracts"; The Modification will allow GB generators to "compete with other generation on [an] equal basis"; There will be "greater opportunities to export electricity from GB – [which] creates a level playing field with continental generation"; The Modification "removes potential electricity import (to GB) distortion; e.g. potential for higher cost imports, that only appear to be relatively "cheap" due to the regulatory treatment of BSUoS type costs, to undercut GB generation as EU generation does not pay BSUoS"; The Modification facilitates the "promotion of efficient EU wide competition in electricity through [the] removal of NTBs [Non Tariff Barriers] [and] maximises allocative officiency across the EU"; and
		allocative efficiency across the EU"; and
		 There is no increase in risk as "generators" and
		suppliers" BSUoS risk is symmetrical. Risk is only transferred". Therefore, there will be "no effect on end consumers from changing the BSUoS charge allocation".
		We disagree strongly that:
		 "End consumer costs will rise due to asymmetric risk". That there is the potential for wholesale prices to "not decrease in line with [the] decrease in BSUoS costs". This will only occur if transition is managed poorly. Assuming transition is adequately covered, there is sufficient competition in the generation market to ensure that reductions in BSUoS costs will be passed on in full to end consumers via the wholesale market.
5	Do you have any additional views on the issue of BSUoS and RCRC interaction in the context of this proposal, and if so, any proposals for how it can be addressed?	We do not believe that there is any interaction between RCRC and BSUoS. We believe that RCRC is a consequence of dual cash out pricing and will continue to function as it currently stands. BSUoS and RCRC can both be either positive or negative at the same time, but can also be in different directions at the same time (RCRC can be positive whilst BSUoS is negative and vice-versa). This suggests that there is no correlation/interaction which needs to be addressed.
6	Will the proposed change have any impact on User IS systems, please provide details, timing and likely costs?	The impact to users IT systems will be minimal. Generators will only be required to remove BSUoS from cost calculations (or set to zero). Suppliers and their IT systems already deal with BSUoS costs; it is only a change to the percentage allocated to such parties.

Respondent:	Paul Mott
Company Name:	EDF Energy
Please express your views regarding the Workgroup Consultation, including rationale.	EDF Energy believes that the workgroup has produced a balanced and reasonable report.
(Please include any issues, suggestions or queries)	
Do you believe that the proposed original or any of the alternatives better facilitate the Applicable CUSC Objectives? Please include your reasoning.	EDF Energy believes that CMP201 would, if passed, better facilitate System Charging Method objective (a). This is because if passed, it would help to create a level playing field between Generators in the EU which in turn should facilitate further cross-border trading of electricity and benefit GB consumers from more competitive wholesale prices.
	We also believe that CMP201 would, if passed, better facilitate System Charging Method objective (c). This is because if passed, it would help National Grid (NG) by promoting a single internal market in electricity and facilitating greater cross-border trading of electricity an objective of the EU 3 rd Package.

Do you support the proposed implementation approach? If not, please state why and provide an alternative	Timescales for implementation are paramount. The modification does not mandate an implementation date. The date needs to take some account in of the general lengths of existing contractual commitments (but not case by case).
suggestion where possible.	In particular we note that removing the 50% BSUoS share from generation will lead to lower wholesale electricity market prices, thereby offsetting the increase in the BSUoS charge to Suppliers. Forward trade horizons are at least 18 months ahead and so at least 18 months notice is needed before implementation to ensure that the reduction in BSUoS charges for generators are able to feed through into lower wholesale prices. This should also allow sufficient time for Suppliers to build any increase into their Supply contracts and so ensure that they are protected against any unexpected increase in BSUoS.
	We note that the final vote of the CUSC panel is to be in July, so that if the Authority's decision were within three months, by October 2012, there would be 18 months' notice to April 2014. Our settlements department has confirmed that monthly phasing- in, as described in the Phase Implementation portions, would not cause any difficulties, and that implementation on a date other than 1 st April would also be acceptable.

	We would suggest implementation on either 1 st April 2014 if the decision was made by 1 st October 2012, or 1 st October 2014 if the decision was made at a later stage. This is because a number of Supplier contracts with customers start/finish on 1 st October 2014, so it is a natural alternative choice to April. Since the modification does not specify an implementation date, either of these dates would be consistent with it, and would not require an alternative amendment.
	We are neutral on the question of phasing. It would add a very small amount of complexity to being a participant in this sector. The complexity added is less under variant (b) (phasing in by periods of six months) than under variant (a) (monthly phasing), and so we should have a small preference for (b) over (a) if phasing is to be the implementation approach.
	The phasing-in of the change could allow a beginning of the phasing prior to April 2014, but the phasing should not then end on April 2014. That is say, phasing resulting in full implementation by April 2014 appears too extreme. The example phasing discussed in the paper, where , the proportion of the BSUoS charges paid by Generators declines at a set rate, either by month or by six month block from 50% to 0% from 1st April 2013 to 31st March 2015, may represent an acceptable approach to the application of two-year phasing-in.
	We do not agree with the more complex phasing variant (c) discussed. This appears to be unnecessarily complex. It also, as a minor issue, raises uncertainties about the proportion of BSUoS that is paid by generators per month during the entire transition period, as that proportion would be dependent on the total volumes of HH and NHH demand, and would not be known in advance.
	We do not agree with phasing-in the change over a five year period, as this appears too long.
Do you have any other comments?	No.
Do you wish to raise a WG Consultation Alternative Request for the Workgroup to consider?	No.

Q	Question	Response
1	Do you have any views on	The work done by the workgroup and National Grid appears to
	how the risk from CMP201	represent a fair attempt at this
	can be quantified?	

Q	Question	Response
2	What are your views on the credit risk on	Technically, there will be a short period where Suppliers are
	Suppliers, either i) the	under-securing against BSUoS. 1 month's BSUOS forward cover (to NG) must be secured, the calculation being against
	under-securing of BSUoS	
	for a short period	BSUoS prices to Suppliers over the last 3 months. Therefore
	-	technically, an adjustment ought to be made for the three
	following implementation	months prior to implementation for a step implementation,
	of CMP201; (should	though this may not be essential. For a phased
	special changes be made	implementation, the increase in BSUoS prices Suppliers are
	to ameliorate this time-	exposed to over two years would be so gradual as to be
	limited risk, or is it	almost entirely picked up at each point in time by the three
	bearable); and ii) the	month averaging in the liability calculation method, so that no
	enduring increase?	change would be required.
		On an enduring basis post-implementation, we do not believe
		that a Supplier should face an insuperable difficulty in the
		increased BSUoS credit exposure.
3	Do you have any	No.
	conflicting information or	
	understandings as to how	
	other EU Member States	
	charge for BSUoS?	
4	Are there any further pros	No.
	or cons that should be	
	highlighted in the	
	assessment and if so, how	
	they might be	
	demonstrated / quantified?	
5	Do you have any	We do not regard RCRC as a natural hedge for BSUoS. If
	additional views on the	parties were entirely in energy balance in a given half-hour,
	issue of BSUoS and RCRC	half of BSUoS costs would still be present. If parties' energy
	interaction in the context	imbalances in a given half-hour were large but the net energy
	of this proposal, and if so,	imbalance was zero, and if there were no need for constraint
	any proposals for how it	resolution, RCRC would still be high.
	can be addressed?	We do agree that there could be merit in the RCRC charging
		(distribution) base being considered in the future, but it is not
		proper business for CMP201, and no dependency can be
		introduced.
6	Will the proposed change	No identifiable impacts
	have any impact on User	
	IS systems, please provide	
	details, timing and likely	
	costs?	

Respondent:	Paul Carter
	Tel 01977 782525
	Email paul.carter@eggboroughpower.co.uk
Company Name:	Eggborough Power Limited
Please express your views regarding the Workgroup Consultation, including rationale. (Please include any issues, suggestions or queries)	Eggborough Power Limited (EPL) supports the removal of BSUoS charges from GB Generators, there by recovering all BSUoS costs from GB Suppliers, as we agree that this would better align the GB market arrangements with other EU member states. The more similar charging structures are between states the greater the competitive pressure will be between plants as the internal market develops and cross border trading increases.
Do you believe that the	For reference, the Applicable CUSC Objectives are:
proposed original or any of the alternatives better facilitate the Applicable CUSC Objectives? Please include your reasoning.	(a) that compliance with the use of system charging methodology facilitates effective competition in the generation and supply of electricity and (so far as is consistent therewith) facilitates competition in the sale, distribution and purchase of electricity;
	By levelling the playing field between generators in the GB market and those in other EU markets the proposal will increase competition and the potential for cross border trade. It will also remove the price advantage for interconnector parties who can import power, but not face BSUoS, thereby earning greater profits on the back of wholesale prices that reflect BSUoS costs.
	EPL recognises the concerns expressed about some supply contracts. However, we believe this problem would be very limited as few parties would have signed contracts that did not allow for cost past through or alterations in price to reflect regulatory changes. Therefore any impacts on suppliers should be short lived.
	(b) that compliance with the use of system charging methodology results in charges which reflect, as far as is reasonably practicable, the costs (excluding any payments between transmission licensees which are made under and in accordance with the STC) incurred by transmission licensees in their transmission businesses and which are compatible with standard condition C26 (Requirements of a connect and manage connection);
	If it is assumed that the customers ultimately pay the costs associated with delivering electricity to them, then placing the charges more directly on customers (via Suppliers) is a more efficient way to allocate the costs.
	As noted with interconnectors, some parties are able to gain for

the BSUoS included power prices though they are not paying BSUoS.
On balance EPL believes that the charging arrangement will be more efficient by making the charges more direct and removing trading distortions.
(c) that, so far as is consistent with sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), the use of system charging methodology, as far as is reasonably practicable, properly takes account of the developments in transmission licensees' transmission businesses.
The transmission business needs to react to the way the EU markets are developing, with policies to enhance interconnection and competition between member states. Development of the system should be based on seeing how the internal market works and responding to changes in power flows.

Do you support the proposed implementation approach? If not, please state why and provide an alternative suggestion where possible.	EPL thinks that 24 months is too long a timescale for implementation. We would rather see the change occur after a year. This should give suppliers time to go and renegotiate or alter contracts as required.
Do you have any other comments?	No
Do you wish to raise a Workgroup Consultation Alternative Request for the Workgroup to consider?	No

Q	Question	Response
1	Do you have any views on how the	If the suppliers believe that they face risks
	risk from CMP201 can be quantified?	then they should evidence those.
2	What are your views on the credit	While there is an implementation risk, EPL
	risk on Suppliers, either i) the under-	feels that the risk will be limited and
	securing of BSUoS for a short period	therefore the costs of trying to alter the credit
	following implementation of CMP201;	calculation is probably not worth the benefit
	(should special changes be made to	to the community. However, a simply
	ameliorate this time-limited risk, or is	solution would be to simply double the
	it bearable); and ii) the enduring	number against which credit is raised
	increase?	recognising the suppliers' liabilities
		effectively double compared to the previous
		year.
		Credit is always an issue from smaller
		players. However, if they have to increase
		credit for BSUoS they should see credit for
		energy reduce as wholesale prices reduce.

Q	Question	Response
1	Do you have any views on how the	If the suppliers believe that they face risks
	risk from CMP201 can be quantified?	then they should evidence those.
2	What are your views on the credit	While there is an implementation risk, EPL
	risk on Suppliers, either i) the under-	feels that the risk will be limited and
	securing of BSUoS for a short period	therefore the costs of trying to alter the credit
	following implementation of CMP201;	calculation is probably not worth the benefit
	(should special changes be made to	to the community. However, a simply
	ameliorate this time-limited risk, or is	solution would be to simply double the
	it bearable); and ii) the enduring	number against which credit is raised
	increase?	recognising the suppliers' liabilities
		effectively double compared to the previous
		year.
		Credit is always an issue from smaller
		players. However, if they have to increase
		credit for BSUoS they should see credit for
		energy reduce as wholesale prices reduce.
3	Do you have any conflicting	No
	information or understandings as to	
	how other EU Member States charge	
	for BSUoS?	
4	Are there any further pros or cons	No
	that should be highlighted in the	
	assessment and if so, how they might be demonstrated / quantified?	
5	Do you have any additional views on	No
5	the issue of BSUoS and RCRC	
	interaction in the context of this	
	proposal, and if so, any proposals for	
	how it can be addressed?	
6	Will the proposed change have any	No
	costs?	
	impact on User IS systems, please provide details, timing and likely	

Respondent:	Esther Sutton
	esther.sutton@eon-uk.com
Company Name:	E.ON
Please express your views regarding the Workgroup Consultation, including rationale. (Please include any issues, suggestions or queries)	CMP201 seeks to align GB electricity market arrangements with those prevalent in the EU where charges equivalent to bsuos are more commonly charged 100% to generation, and in doing so further cross-border trades and the move to one European market for energy. On this basis, E.ON supports CMP201.
Do you believe that the	For reference, the Applicable CUSC Objectives are:
proposed original or any of the alternatives better facilitate the Applicable CUSC Objectives? Please include your reasoning.	(a) that compliance with the use of system charging methodology facilitates effective competition in the generation and supply of electricity and (so far as is consistent therewith) facilitates competition in the sale, distribution and purchase of electricity;
your reasoning.	(b) that compliance with the use of system charging methodology results in charges which reflect, as far as is reasonably practicable, the costs (excluding any payments between transmission licensees which are made under and in accordance with the STC) incurred by transmission licensees in their transmission businesses and which are compatible with standard condition C26 (Requirements of a connect and manage connection);
	(c) that, so far as is consistent with sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), the use of system charging methodology, as far as is reasonably practicable, properly takes account of the developments in transmission licensees' transmission businesses.
	We support the arguments of the Proposer that changing the Use of System Charging Methodology through CMP201 could further Objective (a) to facilitate competition, and (c), that by further aligning GB market arrangements with Europe this is taking due account of developments.

Do you support the proposed implementation approach? If	We see that the Workgroup has not yet concluded what the implementation approach for CMP201 should be; we would
not, please state why and	support a longer time-frame for implementation. While as a
provide an alternative	Charging Methodology change an implementation of/beginning
suggestion where possible.	01 April should give parties more notice than for a change to
	another part of the CUSC, clearly the Authority's decision date
	will determine exactly how much notice companies receive of

	this change. We note that not only a 2 year but a 3 year transition period may not allow enough time for this change to be incorporated in Supply contracts with some customers, hence we do not support the Proposer's suggestion of an implementation date of 24 months.
	We note the arguments for and against a phased or step-change implementation; and that as per para. 5.8 that if this change required system changes then a step-change approach might be more manageable than phased implementation. However on this point we believe that CMP201 should not require any significant changes to our User systems so for us IS changes are not a barrier to a phased approach.
Do you have any other comments?	Not at this stage.
Do you wish to raise a WG Consultation Alternative Request for the Workgroup to consider?	No.

Q	Question	Response
1	Do you have any views on	The temporary transition risk to Suppliers will only affect a
	how the risk from CMP201	certain proportion of contracts and should be manageable
	can be quantified?	given long enough advance knowledge of implementation to
		incorporate this change into forthcoming agreements.
		However as the Report acknowledges, commercial sensitivity
		means that it would be difficult to quantify the risk to Suppliers
		of contractual arrangements that might not allow pass-through
		or reopening under these circumstances. Consequently, to
		minimise this risk it would seem prudent to ensure a longer
		timeframe for implementation than the 24 months initially
		suggested.
		We do not believe that the risk premium owing to the
		variability/volatility and ex-post nature of bsuos is more easily
		managed by Generators as one Group member suggested per
		para. 4.13-18, and cannot see how it would be practical to
		quantify this theory.

Q	Question	Response
2	What are your views on	We do not believe that these present significant issues.
	the credit risk on	
	Suppliers, either i) the	We recognise that if CMP201 was implemented the current
	under-securing of BSUoS	credit arrangements risk under-securing bsuos for a short
	for a short period	period post-implementation but do not expect that this would
	following implementation	be a serious risk; if further information suggests otherwise then
	of CMP201; (should	this might justify changes to limit this risk.
	special changes be made	
	to ameliorate this time-	Suppliers would have an enduring requirement to increase
	limited risk, or is it	their credit cover, but we agree that, as the Group has
	bearable); and ii) the	identified, independent generators would see the opposite
	enduring increase?	effect therefore any negative impact on competition from the
		former would be offset by the latter.
3	Do you have any	No.
	conflicting information or	
	understandings as to how	
	other EU Member States	
	charge for BSUoS?	
4	Are there any further pros	Not that we are aware of.
	or cons that should be	
	highlighted in the	
	assessment and if so, how	
	they might be	
	demonstrated / quantified?	
5	Do you have any	No additional views.
	additional views on the	
	issue of BSUoS and RCRC	
	interaction in the context	
	of this proposal, and if so,	
	any proposals for how it	
	can be addressed?	
6	Will the proposed change	We believe that there should be no significant impact on IS
	have any impact on User	systems for either our Generation or Supply business.
	IS systems, please provide	
	details, timing and likely	
	costs?	

Respondent:	Chris Hill (<u>chris.hill@first-utility.com</u>)
Company Name:	First Utility
Please express your views regarding the Workgroup Consultation, including rationale. (Please include any issues, suggestions or queries)	First Utility is not in support of the above proposal as we believe that forcing suppliers to take on the whole risk related to BSUoS is disproportionate and will mean that RCRC and the energy balancing element of BSUoS will no longer net to zero. In addition, suppliers' credit requirements in relation to BSUoS are likely to increase and this will have a negative impact on competition, particularly in relation to smaller suppliers who do not own generation businesses to offset this increased charge. Working capital which could be used to grow these businesses will be diverted to this new higher cost.
Do you believe that the proposed original or any of the alternatives better facilitate the Applicable CUSC Objectives? Please include your reasoning.	We do not believe that implementation of the proposal will better facilitate the Applicable CUSC Objectives due to the negative impact on competition and the creation of increased barriers to entry by smaller suppliers in relation to BSUoS credit requirements as described above.

Do you support the proposed implementation approach? If not, please state why and provide an alternative suggestion where possible.	We do not support implementation. Although a proposed implementation date of 2 years may reduce the potential windfall effect for certain generations, we do not believe that this will ameliorate the creation of new barriers to market entry for smaller suppliers.
Do you have any other comments?	
Do you wish to raise a WG Consultation Alternative Request for the Workgroup to consider?	No.

Q	Question	Response
1	Do you have any views on how the risk from CMP201 can be quantified?	No.

Q	Question	Response
2	What are your views on the credit risk on Suppliers, either i) the under-securing of BSUoS for a short period following implementation of CMP201; (should special changes be made to ameliorate this time- limited risk, or is it bearable); and ii) the enduring increase?	Our main concern is that the increased credit costs around BSUoS will disproportionately affect smaller suppliers and thus create a barrier to entry.
3	Do you have any conflicting information or understandings as to how other EU Member States charge for BSUoS?	No.
4	Are there any further pros or cons that should be highlighted in the assessment and if so, how they might be demonstrated / quantified?	No.
5	Do you have any additional views on the issue of BSUoS and RCRC interaction in the context of this proposal, and if so, any proposals for how it can be addressed?	No.
6	Will the proposed change have any impact on User IS systems, please provide details, timing and likely costs?	We do not believe that this will have a direct impact on our systems.

Respondent:	Simon Lord
Company Name:	International Power
Please express your views regarding the Workgroup Consultation, including rationale. (Please include any issues, suggestions or queries)	We do not believe that either generation or supply is able to hedge BSUoS to any meaningful extent and the collection of BSUoS is simply a revenue recovery exercise. Therefore, the principle that should be applied is that the collection should optimise market efficiency. We believe that reducing barriers to cross border trading (removal of BSUoS from generation) will improve the overall competitiveness of the market.
Do you believe that the proposed original or any of the alternatives better facilitate the Applicable CUSC Objectives? Please include your reasoning.	Yes, we believe the proposal will bring the cost base of GB generation into line with that in continental Europe. Thus overall it will improve the efficiency of the GB market with the benefits of improved efficiency being felt by customers.

Do you support the proposed implementation approach? If not, please state why and provide an alternative suggestion where possible.	We support the proposed implementation approach with the proviso that there should be adequate notice to the market to ensure that there should be no windfall gains or losses across market players We believe that the notice period should be long enough to allow an orderly transition but not so long such that the benefit of the modification is not realised. A notice period of 36 month would allow the market to factor in any price changes.
Do you have any other comments?	No.
Do you wish to raise a WG Consultation Alternative Request for the Workgroup to consider?	No.

Q	Question	Response
1	Do you have any views on how the risk from CMP201 can be quantified?	We do not believe that CMP 201 presents a significant additional risk to the industry as long as the implementation date is notified ahead of time to the industry as proposed.

Q	Question	Response
2	What are your views on the credit risk on Suppliers, either i) the under-securing of BSUoS for a short period following implementation of CMP201; (should special changes be made to ameliorate this time- limited risk, or is it bearable); and ii) the enduring increase?	We believe that the security implications should be addressed by the working group such that no party is required to hold more security than is required under the current arrangements or, if this is not possible, any addition security required should be objectively justified.
3	Do you have any conflicting information or understandings as to how other EU Member States charge for BSUoS?	No.
4	Are there any further pros or cons that should be highlighted in the assessment and if so, how they might be demonstrated / quantified?	No.
5	Do you have any additional views on the issue of BSUoS and RCRC interaction in the context of this proposal, and if so, any proposals for how it can be addressed?	No.
6	Will the proposed change have any impact on User IS systems, please provide details, timing and likely costs?	This will potentially impact on retail IS systems but with sufficient notice this can be managed by existing business processes.

Respondent:	Helen Inwood; <u>Helen.Inwood@npower.com</u> ; 07795 354788
Company Name:	RWE npower
Please express your views regarding the Workgroup Consultation, including rationale. (Please include any issues, suggestions or queries)	We are very concerned at the lack of clarity around implementation dates in this consultation. The implementation date needs to be sufficiently far in the future so preventing potential windfall gains for generators and windfall losses for suppliers on already purchased commodity contracts.
	The working group have been unable to undertake analysis on the extent of windfall gains and losses. <u>A full impact analysis</u> <u>needs to be carried out.</u> This needs to look at timescale of implementation, level of BSUoS prices etc. It is totally inappropriate to decide on an arbitrary date without a full understanding of the impact to market participants – including small suppliers and larger I&C consumers who have already hedged volume.
	The implementation timetable should only be decided once this analysis is available and <u>should ensure that there are no windfall</u> gains or losses as a result of this regulatory change.
	During the transition period the wholesale market will need to develop a trade-able instrument to reflect no BSuoS for generators - such an instrument will need time to develop and its liquidity will be key to making the transition effective.
	Ofgem's target to increase liquidity may be undermined by this proposal, given this is adding to the uncertainty in longer dated contracts that are currently within normal liquidity.
	The Description of the CUSC modification clearly states that 'there should be no adverse effects for GB end consumers' and 'GB consumers will benefit from more competitive arrangements delivered through a wider fully functioning competitive market in generation'. This is very misleading statement since analysis presented to the working group on 15 th March indicate that prices to end GB consumers will in fact go up since generators will be exporting more to the continent. This analysis is not reflected in the consultation and is therefore providing Industry Parties with an inaccurate view of the impact on consumers. On this basis, we do not believe that this consultation is providing enough information for Industry Parties to fully understand the impacts on consumer prices. We would therefore suggest that it is unreasonable to expect Industry Parties to support or reject CMP201 since the consultation is not providing a balanced view on the impact on consumers?

	BSUoS, by its very nature, can be a difficult charge for market participants to forecast and can be very volatile. By transferring all of BSUoS to suppliers, suppliers are now faced with increased risks through more exposure to a volatile charge. The consultation refers to vertically integrated utilities being equally exposed to both the loss and gain and suggests that such companies would be equally exposed to both loss and gain at group level. It is important to recognise that these utilities must operate separate generation and supply businesses. In addition, it is very unlikely that a vertically integrated company will have a fully matched portfolio of generation and supply. This therefore means that there will be overall windfall gain or loss at group level depending on whether the group is overall long or short. This should not be an outcome of implementing regulatory change. We recognise that CMP201 has been raised to seek to align GB Balancing Services arrangements with those prevailing in other EU member states. We believe that CMP202, if approved, will achieve that in the short term. However, we do not believe that the impacts of CMP201 are well enough understood in order to push this through quickly. Other wider options should be explored to mitigate the risks or impacts on suppliers and consumers e.g. fixed price BSUOS
Do you believe that the	No. We do not believe this proposal meets any of the objectives.
proposed original or any of the alternatives better facilitate the Applicable CUSC Objectives? Please include your reasoning.	As stated above, the impact of CMP201 on market participants is unclear and a full impact analysis needs to be carried out before it is clear whether or not this proposal will better facilitate competition. The link between BSUoS and RCRC has not been addressed. The likelihood of windfall gains to generators and windfall losses to suppliers during a transition period – with no underlying analysis on how that transition period should be determined – is an unacceptable consequence of this proposal. As a result, we do not believe any of the objectives can be shown to be met.
	For reference, the Applicable CUSC Objectives are:
	(a) that compliance with the use of system charging methodology facilitates effective competition in the generation and supply of electricity and (so far as is consistent therewith) facilitates competition in the sale, distribution and purchase of electricity;
	 (b) that compliance with the use of system charging methodology results in charges which reflect, as far as is reasonably practicable, the costs (excluding any payments between transmission licensees which are made under and in accordance with the STC) incurred by transmission licensees in their transmission businesses and which are compatible with standard condition C26 (Requirements of a connect and manage connection); (c) that, so far as is consistent with sub-paragraphs (a) and (b),

the use of system charging methodology, as far as is reasonably
practicable, properly takes account of the developments in
transmission licensees' transmission businesses.

Do you support the proposed	We would support this change provided that impact analysis is
implementation approach? If	undertaken and implementation is outside current hedging
not, please state why and	timescales.
provide an alternative	We reject the change if it is implemented inside current hedging
suggestion where possible.	timescales.
Do you have any other comments?	There are a large number of regulatory changes being discussed at the moment which will impact prices (EFA blocks to calendar months, liquidity market, SCR etc). This uncertainty results in suppliers and generators abilities to forecast prices. This will inevitably lead to concerns around entering into longer term contracting arrangements between consumers, suppliers and generators since it is difficult to mitigate these regulatory risks. We believe this issue should be looked at in conjunction with some of the other changes going through.
Do you wish to raise a WG	If yes, please complete a Workgroup Consultation Alternative
Consultation Alternative	Request form, available on National Grid's website, and return to
Request for the Workgroup to	the above email address with your completed Workgroup
consider?	Consultation response proforma.

Q	Question	Response
1	Do you have any views on	Work needs to be carried out to establish current hedging
	how the risk from CMP201	timescales. The implementation date should be later than that
	can be quantified?	period to avoid windfall gains or losses. The implementation
		date should be announced in sufficient time to allow the
		market time to develop new products with sufficient liquidity.
2	What are your views on	Doubling the BSUoS charge for suppliers will have a
	the credit risk on	detrimental impact on the credit cover they require to operate
	Suppliers, either i) the	in the market. This has particular impact on small suppliers.
	under-securing of BSUoS	The impact of this has again not been made clear in the
	for a short period	consultation. At the working group on 15 th March, National
	following implementation	Grid presented numbers based on current BSUoS prices
	of CMP201; (should	which implied that, at current levels, small suppliers would not
	special changes be made	need to review their credit cover limits. However, this takes no
	to ameliorate this time-	account of (a) future BSUoS prices which could be much
	limited risk, or is it	larger than now (b) where suppliers have not minimised their
	bearable); and ii) the	credit cover requirements for reasons of policy or timing during
	enduring increase?	the year. Any impact analysis should include the scenario that
		BSUoS charges may rise (e.g. 2008 levels?) or assume that
		suppliers are minimising their credit cover arrangements.
		Without this analysis, again, the impacts cannot be quantified.

Q	Question	Response
3	Do you have any	No.
	conflicting information or	
	understandings as to how	
	other EU Member States	
	charge for BSUoS?	
4	Are there any further pros	See Page 1
	or cons that should be	
	highlighted in the	
	assessment and if so, how	
	they might be	
	demonstrated / quantified?	
5	Do you have any	BSUoS is inextricably linked to RCRC and imbalance.
	additional views on the	Analysis needs to be done on the impact of continuing to pass
	issue of BSUoS and RCRC	through RCRC to the generators. While appreciating RCRC is
	interaction in the context	subject to BSC rather than CUSC, the two charges should be
	of this proposal, and if so,	treated together rather than in isolation. For this reason, we
	any proposals for how it	suggest that CMP201 and an overall impact analysis form part
	can be addressed?	of the SCR on electricity cash-out arrangements. This will also
		allow other options to be looked at which meet the wider
		objectives.
6	Will the proposed change	Not clear yet
	have any impact on User	
	IS systems, please provide	
	details, timing and likely	
	costs?	

Respondent:	James Anderson; james.anderson@scottishpower.com
Company Name:	ScottishPower Energy Management
Please express your views regarding the Workgroup Consultation, including rationale.	ScottishPower and ScottishPower Renewables support implementation of CMP201. Removal of BSUoS charges from generation will remove a barrier to cross-border trade with continental European counterparties. CMP201 should be implemented in conjunction with CMP202 (Removal of
(Please include any issues, suggestions or queries)	BSUoS from Interconnector lead parties). To implement CMP202 without CMP201 would place generators in GB at a commercial disadvantage to continental European generators who would not face BSUoS when selling into the GB market.
Do you believe that the proposed original or any of the alternatives better facilitate the Applicable CUSC Objectives? Please include your reasoning.	 For reference, the Applicable CUSC Objectives are: (a) that compliance with the use of system charging methodology facilitates effective competition in the generation and supply of electricity and (so far as is consistent therewith) facilitates competition in the sale, distribution and purchase of electricity; CMP202 better facilitates effective competition in the generation of electricity both within GB and across Europe through removal of a barrier to trade. (b) that compliance with the use of system charging methodology results in charges which reflect, as far as is reasonably practicable, the costs (excluding any payments between transmission licensees which are made under and in accordance with the STC) incurred by transmission licensees in their transmission businesses and which are compatible with standard condition C26 (Requirements of a connect and manage connection); Implementation of CMP202 will be neutral in facilitating achievement of Objective (b). As in the existing baseline, the cost allocation methodology will continue to accurately reflect charges into the appropriate time periods but will neither improve nor weaken cost reflectivity. (c) that, so far as is consistent with sub-paragraphs (a) and
	 (b), the use of system charging methodology, as far as is reasonably practicable, properly takes account of the developments in transmission licensees' transmission businesses. CMP202 will better reflect developments in the transmission licensees' businesses as it will take account of the increased interconnectivity between GB and continental Europe and the development of cross-border trading.

suggestion where possible.	introduction) will avoid the need for alternative trading products to be created (either including or excluding BSUoS) thus minimising the impact on participant systems.
Do you have any other comments?	CMP202 (Removal of BSUoS form Interconnector lead parties) should not be implemented without implementation of CMP201 as this would exacerbate the position of GB generators when competing with continental European generators.
Do you wish to raise a WG Consultation Alternative Request for the Workgroup to consider?	No.

Q	Question	Response
1	Do you have any views on how the risk from CMP201 can be quantified?	ScottishPower believes that there is very little risk inherent in CMP201. In an efficient, competitive market for generation, with a large number of generators we believe that the wholesale price will reflect the reduction in BSUoS payable by generators. Any Supplier issues over the uncertainty in
		forecasting BSUoS could be addressed by subsequent modification of the BSUoS charging methodology to reflect the fact that Suppliers are largely unable to respond to the half- hourly price signal contained within BSUoS. At a future date, the methodology could be changed to a volume-based, cost recovery mechanism based upon forecast costs with annual reconciliation to outturn costs.
2	What are your views on the credit risk on Suppliers, either i) the under-securing of BSUoS for a short period following implementation of CMP201; (should special changes be made to ameliorate this time- limited risk, or is it bearable); and ii) the enduring increase?	Any under-securing of BSUoS by Suppliers will be a short- term, transitory issue which will resolve itself as the higher charges are taken into the existing credit calculation. The low probability of a major Supplier default during this period does not justify the introduction of special measures over this brief period. The proposed implementation timetable (2 years) will allow Suppliers sufficient time to secure the additional credit cover required in the most cost-effective manner. The scale of additional credit cover required will be negligible in comparison to the trading credit lines required to secure energy purchases.
3	Do you have any conflicting information or understandings as to how other EU Member States charge for BSUoS?	Our understanding of the treatment of charges for balancing services is in agreement with the ENTSO-E paper of May 2011 in that the majority of charges fall almost exclusively upon Suppliers across the Member States.

Q	Question	Response
4	Are there any further pros or cons that should be highlighted in the assessment and if so, how they might be demonstrated / quantified?	ScottishPower considers that all material pros and cons have been addressed in the consultation document.
5	Do you have any additional views on the issue of BSUoS and RCRC interaction in the context of this proposal, and if so, any proposals for how it can be addressed?	ScottishPower believes that the correlation between BSUoS and RCRC has largely broken down due to the increasing use of more economic constraint management services by the System Operator rather than the Balancing Mechanism for system management purposes. Further analysis would be required before we were convinced that part or all of the components of RCRC should be returned only to Suppliers.
6	Will the proposed change have any impact on User IS systems, please provide details, timing and likely costs?	A single transition at a set future date would have minimal impact on User IS systems. This would allow generators to factor the removal of BSUoS into their selling prices and Suppliers to ensure that the change in BSUoS is reflected in their wholesale electricity purchase prices. Both generators and suppliers could take account of this in a simple manner. A phased transition such as that discussed in 4.66 to 4.68 would be more problematic and require extensive changes to trading systems and User forecasting systems.

Respondent:	Colin Prestwich
Company Name:	SmartestEnergy Limited
Please express your views regarding the Workgroup Consultation, including rationale. (Please include any issues, suggestions or queries)	It is not clear to us whether this question is about the process or the substantive issues. If the former we have no comment, if the latter please see below.
Do you believe that the proposed original or any of the alternatives better facilitate the Applicable CUSC Objectives? Please include your reasoning.	We do not believe that this modification on its own facilitates effective competition or results in cost reflective charges. This is because the supply side is even less able to respond to price signals than the generation side. We believe that locational BSUoS would have been a welcome development in this regard. However, given that locational BSUoS has been rejected by Ofgem within the last couple of years and in the context of more recent European developments we are now of the opinion that the costs of constraints (a large component of BSUoS) are best dealt with by transferring the costs into the day ahead energy markets. In summary, we would say that the proposals meet the CUSC objectives in part in combination with market coupling.

Do you support the proposed implementation approach? If not, please state why and provide an alternative suggestion where possible.	Yes. Ordinarily as a supplier we would prefer to see a phased approach. However, for the reasons stated above we believe that this change should be made at or around the time that market coupling effects regional day ahead wholesale pricing to reflect the costs of constraints. For this reason we prefer to see a stepped (not phased) approach but with at least two years' lead time.
Do you have any other comments?	No
Do you wish to raise a Workgroup Consultation Alternative Request for the Workgroup to consider?	No.

Specific questions for CMP201

Q	Question	Response
1	Do you have any views on how the	
	risk from CMP201 can be quantified?	No

2	What are your views on the credit risk on Suppliers, either i) the under- securing of BSUoS for a short period following implementation of CMP201; (should special changes be made to ameliorate this time-limited risk, or is it bearable); and ii) the enduring	Clearly, for us as a supplier, the credit requirement would double. Whilst this may be manageable for SmartestEnergy, this is yet another initiative which throws additional costs on suppliers and this cannot be good for the competition which small suppliers
3	increase? Do you have any conflicting information or understandings as to how other EU Member States charge for BSUoS?	bring to the market. No
4	Are there any further pros or cons that should be highlighted in the assessment and if so, how they might be demonstrated / quantified?	No
5	Do you have any additional views on the issue of BSUoS and RCRC interaction in the context of this proposal, and if so, any proposals for how it can be addressed?	We are not convinced this is a serious issue. It is true that there is a correlation between RCRC and BSUoS, but it is not the case that one is compensation for the other, or indeed, directly related. As the document explains, total costs should, after the transition period, be the same due to completion in the generation market. In our view RCRC will not be unduly affected.
6	Will the proposed change have any impact on User IS systems, please provide details, timing and likely costs?	On the assumption that the format of information flows does not change and that it is merely the values in the fields that change there should be no IT impact on Smartest Energy.

Respondent:	Please insert your name and contact details (phone number or email address) Andrew Green Telephone: 07837 419 454 <u>Andrew.green@totalgp.com</u>
Company Name: Please express your views regarding the Workgroup Consultation, including rationale. (Please include any issues, suggestions or queries)	Total Gas & Power Ltd (TGPL) TGPL understands and is broadly supportive of the rationale behind this change proposal. However it is imperative that the implementation minimises disruption to customers and suppliers and as such TGPL would strongly advocate Workgroup option 2 which would allow for a 5 year transition with a hard cut-over at a fixed date. A phased implementation would be extremely disruptive and make the transition more complex and costly to manage. Providing a 5 year lead time would allow Suppliers to take account of the increased BSUOS charges in their contractual arrangements with consumers. The proposed 24 months is insufficient notice period.
Do you believe that the proposed original or any of the alternatives better facilitate the Applicable CUSC Objectives? Please include your reasoning.	Yes

Do you support the proposed implementation approach? If not, please state why and provide an alternative suggestion where possible.	No, 24 months does not give sufficient time for suppliers to back of the increased BSUOS charges in their forward contracts with consumers. TGPL believes option ii) giving 5 years notice would allow for this.
Do you have any other comments?	No
Do you wish to raise a Workgroup Consultation Alternative Request for the Workgroup to consider?	No

Specific questions for CMP201

Q Question Response

Do you have any views on how the	No
-	
-	This will add to the credit burden of smaller
risk on Suppliers, either i) the under-	suppliers in the market and therefore has the
securing of BSUoS for a short period	potential to impact supply competition but
following implementation of CMP201;	TGPL believes this impact to be small
(should special changes be made to	
ameliorate this time-limited risk, or is	
it bearable); and ii) the enduring	
increase?	
Do you have any conflicting	No
•	
•	
	No
	110
•••	
	No
how it can be addressed?	
Will the proposed change have any	If the transition is phased or insufficient
impact on User IS systems, please	notice is given to Users there is potential for
provide details, timing and likely	IT impacts and reconciliation processes
costs?	would be required which would be costly to
	administer and disruptive and unwelcome
	for end consumers who would receive
	unanticipated ad hoc reconciliation invoices
	following implementation of CMP201; (should special changes be made to ameliorate this time-limited risk, or is it bearable); and ii) the enduring increase? Do you have any conflicting information or understandings as to how other EU Member States charge for BSUoS? Are there any further pros or cons that should be highlighted in the assessment and if so, how they might be demonstrated / quantified? Do you have any additional views on the issue of BSUoS and RCRC interaction in the context of this proposal, and if so, any proposals for how it can be addressed? Will the proposed change have any impact on User IS systems, please provide details, timing and likely

Respondent:	Garth Graham (01738 456000 garth.graham@sse.com)
Company Name:	SSE
Please express your views regarding the Workgroup Consultation, including rationale. (Please include any issues,	We support in principle the CMP201 proposal, as detailed in the consultation document, as it facilitates in particular cross border trading of electricity. In our view the Workgroup has identified a number of important aspects of the proposal that need to be clarified before we can
suggestions or queries)	give a definitive view on CMP201. We hope our answers to the questions below will assist the Workgroup in its deliberations.
Do you believe that the	
proposed original or any of the alternatives better	For reference, the Applicable CUSC Objectives are:
facilitate the Applicable CUSC Objectives? Please include your reasoning.	(a) that compliance with the use of system charging methodology facilitates effective competition in the generation and supply of electricity and (so far as is consistent therewith) facilitates competition in the sale, distribution and purchase of electricity;
	(b) that compliance with the use of system charging methodology results in charges which reflect, as far as is reasonably practicable, the costs (excluding any payments between transmission licensees which are made under and in accordance with the STC) incurred by transmission licensees in their transmission businesses and which are compatible with standard condition C26 (Requirements of a connect and manage connection);
	(c) that, so far as is consistent with sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), the use of system charging methodology, as far as is reasonably practicable, properly takes account of the developments in transmission licensees' transmission businesses.
	Yes. In our view CMP201 (as currently described in the consultation document) does in our view better facilitate the Applicable Use of System Charging Methodology Objectives.
	In particular we concur, for the reasons set out in the Proposal, that CMP201 better meets Objective (a) as it demonstrably facilitates effective competition in the generation and supply of electricity within GB and within the EU.
Do you support the proposed implementation approach? If not, please state why and provide an alternative suggestion where possible.	. We note the Proposer suggests a two year implementation period; i.e. approved by, say, mid March 2013, introduced into the CUSC ten days later and brought into effect from 1 st April 2015. We agree with this. In our view this most appropriately reflects the most likely contractual position (where market prices / trades etc., extend out for circa two years).

	However, we appreciate there maybe a desire to consider a phased transition.
	In terms of the associated phased transition options noted in paragraph 4.63 (and detailed in subsequent paragraphs) we can see there being some merit in a two year transition period, from 1 st April 2013 to 31 st March 2015; i.e. Option (i).
	We also note the deliberations over variations (a), (b) and (c). In our view variation (c) seems the most appropriate as it takes account of the market conditions, such as contract rounds for industrial and commercial customers.
Do you have any other comments?	We have no additional comments at this time over and above those detailed in this response.
Do you wish to raise a WG Consultation Alternative Request for the Workgroup to consider?	No.

Specific questions for CMP201

Q	Question	Response
1	Do you have any views on how the risk from CMP201 can be quantified?	We note the Workgroup deliberations on the risks associated with BSUoS volatility as set out in the consultation document. We have no additional views on how the risk from CMP201 can be quantified.
2	What are your views on the credit risk on Suppliers, either i) the under-securing of BSUoS for a short period following implementation of CMP201; (should special changes be made	We note the deliberations of the Workgroup on the matter of credit risk. In terms of the risk noted in paragraph 4.29 we believe such a risk, of under securitisation, could perhaps be ameliorated by a phased transition (over two years from April 2013 to March 2015) as this may reduce the amount at risk of being undersecured.
	to ameliorate this time- limited risk, or is it bearable); and ii) the enduring increase?	In respect of the enduring increase, given that this risk already exists (on generators) and that this cost (in full or in part) is captured within the price that generators charge to suppliers there should not be an unmanageable situation going forward if CMP201 is implemented.
		In terms of the concern noted in paragraph 4.30 we believe this too could perhaps be ameliorated by a phased transition (over two years from April 2013 to March 2015) as the amount that a Supplier (big or small) would be asked to secure would increase over 24 months rather than as a 'big bang' event, say, on 1 st April 2015.

Q	Question	Response
3	Do you have any conflicting information or understandings as to how other EU Member States charge for BSUoS?	We note the Workgroup deliberations on this matter (as outlined in paragraphs 4.34-4.37). We have no additional information on this matter. We believe that the ENTSO-E publication of May 2011 provides a useful and authoritative comparison of the way EU Member States charge for BSUoS.
		This analysis; as summarised in paragraph 4.35; supports the proposition set out in CMP201 that the charges currently applied to Generators should be migrated over to Suppliers to facilitate cross border trading in electricity and supporting the internal electricity market.
4	Are there any further pros or cons that should be highlighted in the assessment and if so, how they might be demonstrated / quantified?	We note the 'pros & cons' outlined in Table 1. We have no additional items to add to the list.
5	Do you have any additional views on the issue of BSUoS and RCRC interaction in the context of this proposal, and if so, any proposals for how it can be addressed?	We note that the Workgroup is still considering the issue of the interaction between BSUoS and RCRC and we look forward to reading and considering the conclusions the Workgroup reach on this in due course.
6	Will the proposed change have any impact on User IS systems, please provide details, timing and likely costs?	At this stage, given the information contained in the consultation document, we do not envisage there being any appreciable impact on our IT systems.

Respondent:	Sarah Owen
	Sarah.owen@centrica.co.uk 01753 431052
Company Name:	The Centrica Group of companies excluding Centrica Storage Ltd.
Do you believe that CMP201 better facilitates the Applicable CUSC Objectives? Please include your reasoning.	We do not believe that this modification betters any of the relevant objectives. The detrimental impact to GB end consumers has been modelled to be in the region of £180m per annum, in contrast to the claim in the original proposal that there would be no detrimental impact on customers. This is both unwelcome and unnecessary, particularly in the current economic environment, and negates any positive impacts that flow to GB generators.
	We believe that the proposal potentially has a detrimental impact on Applicable CUSC Objective (a) as the increased BSUoS risk and costs, in total and to GB end users, will adversely impact competition in supply, as smaller or less vertically integrated suppliers are less able to manage uncertain cash-flows and increased costs. We would note that this means Applicable CUSC Objective (c) may not be relevant as it is required to be consistent with Objectives (a) & (b). i.e. better facilitation cannot be considered if in conflict with either of the other objectives.
What are your views on the implementation approaches proposed in the CMP201 Original and in the Workgroup Alternative CUSC Modifications?	Notwithstanding the above comments that we do not support the implementation of this modification or any of the alternatives, if this modification is implemented there should be a sufficient delay to ensure that no one party incurs windfall losses or gains as a result of this proposal. We believe the upmost caution should be employed in ensuring there is no double-paying of BSUoS and would suggest that a 5-year delay is preferable (WACM2)
Do you have any other comments?	Given that Ofgem have recently launched the SCR for electricity balancing, and, plan to launch a project looking at future trading arrangements and given that there is no underlining transmission licence requirement or developments in the European arena that necessitates this modification which results in a detrimental impact to GB end users, we believe that this modification should be rejected. We suggest a more holistic approach will be considered and developed under Ofgem's proposed projects. We believe that a full Impact Assessment is required, due to the significant detrimental impact on customers of this modification.

Respondent:	Cem Suleyman – <u>cem.suleyman@draxpower.com</u>
Company Name:	Drax Power Limited
Do you believe that CMP201 better facilitates the Applicable CUSC Objectives? Please include your reasoning.	Our view on whether CMP201 better facilitates the Applicable CUSC Objects (ACOs) is unchanged from the previous Code Administrator Consultation. Therefore the reasoning provided in our previous Code Administrator Consultation response is also unchanged. For ease of reference we have reproduced the content of that response below. However, we have also adding additional comments, reflecting on the Workgroup discussions following Ofgem's send back of the Modification. For ease of reference these comments are underlined in red.
	We believe that the relevant ACOs are (a) and (c). We believe that CMP201 (the Original and the two WACMs) better facilitate both of these ACOs. We provide our reasoning against each of the ACOs in turn.
	ACO (a)
	The evidence presented in the Code Administrator Consultation document demonstrates that the vast majority of European electricity markets place BSUoS (equivalent) charges exclusively on demand. As a result, the wholesale electricity price in these markets will not include the cost of balancing services.
	Consequently, GB generators are placed at a disadvantage when trading in other European markets via interconnectors when compared with equivalent generation (assuming generation costs are identical in each market). This is because GB generators must factor in BSUoS costs as part of their Short Run Marginal Cost.
	We believe that CMP201 will better align GB Balancing Services charging arrangements with those prevalent in other EU Member States. By levying all BSUoS costs on demand, this will align the GB 'generation stack' with those located in other European markets. This change will provide a level playing field in the GB market and in those EU markets to which GB is interconnected.
	Implementing CMP201 (alongside the already approved CMP202) will:
	Facilitate efficient cross border trade, enhancing GB and EU electricity market competition and security of supply, benefitting all EU end consumers; Remove the existing barrier to GB exports that occurs due to the differential treatment of BSUoS (equivalent) costs across European electricity markets (CMP202 on its own only partially removes this distortion); and Avoid subsiding electricity imports to GB from continental Europe (this distortion will occur if CMP202 is implemented on its own).
	The distortion highlighted in the latter bullet point would occur because power generated in GB will continue to be subject to BSUoS whilst imports will not be liable to equivalent balancing costs. This may result in 'higher total cost' power being imported due to the different treatment of balancing costs across the value chain in differing European Member States. This would result in the

inefficient trade of wholesale electricity. Consequently, implementing CMP201 (alongside CMP202) better facilitates efficient competition and cross border trade.

Interpretation of the modelling

Modelling undertaken by National Grid for the Workgroup to demonstrate the effects of implementing CMP201 have substantiated the points made above. The modelling shows by implementing CMP201, efficient cross border trade is facilitated within the EU as both total producer surpluses and total consumer costs fall. These findings demonstrate two main effects of facilitating efficient competition. The first effect, which reduces total consumer costs, can be described as a productive efficiency effect, i.e. the market employs a more efficient allocation of resources. The second effect, which reduces producer surpluses, is a result of competitive entry competing away producer rents. These two effects are the rationale for implementing CMP201.

In terms of the numerical accuracy of the modelling, we agree with the majority Workgroup view (as detailed in paragraph 1.11). In summary, the model is unable to provide precise numerical values but sufficiently demonstrates the main effects of the Modification in isolation from other market variables i.e. optimising cross border trade and facilitating efficient competition (as discussed in the paragraph above).

We believe it is important to highlight that the overall cost/benefit values presented in the Consultation document are not robust. These values have been derived by adding together Δ consumer cost figures with Δ producer surplus figures. Such values do not denote an overall benefit/cost as the producer and consumer calculations are not directly comparable. The producer surplus calculation is a proxy for profit, i.e. the price a commodity is sold minus cost. The consumer cost value is a measure of the total cost of providing electricity. It is not a measure of consumer surplus in the Marshallian sense, i.e. the difference between what a consumer is willing to pay for a commodity and what he or she actually pays. Therefore adding together the two calculations does not provide an overall market benefit/cost value. Both the consumer cost and producer surplus calculations have to be viewed in isolation to provide a correct understanding of the effects of the modification. The overall cost/benefit values provided should therefore have no bearing on the evaluation of CMP201. We note that these overall cost/benefit values have now been removed from the Report. We welcome this change.

We believe that caution must also be taken when interpreting the increase in GB consumer costs, as revealed by the modelling. While consumer costs increase in GB (although this increase is not certain to remain in perpetuity) it must be noted that consumer costs across all the markets modelled falls as a result of promoting efficient competition. The objective of modification and ACO (a) is to facilitate efficient competition. The objective is not to ensure that consumer costs in particular Member States are kept artificially lower than they would otherwise be in a competitive single EU market. It is our view that primacy should be given to ensuring that markets operate competitively and efficiently. This is how consumers benefit from free markets and competition, of which the rationale is well understood and accepted. Holding energy prices artificially low harms consumer interests in the long run due to the distortion of

investment signals such a policy would create, i.e. lower prices reduce investment, thereby reduce supply and raise prices, which are then kept artificially low thus reinforcing the vicious circle.
Finally, we note that where GB producer surpluses increase following the implementation of CMP201, this will in a competitive market act as a signal for competitive entry and rivalry. Therefore it is unlikely these surpluses will continue in perpetuity. Such competitive activity spurred by increased surpluses will benefit end consumers in the long run in the form of efficient investment, pricing and quality of service.
In light of further Workgroup meetings held following send back, we agree with the majority conclusion of the Workgroup on the long term impact of the Modification, summarised in paragraph 1.12 of the Report. We believe this is consistent with our view provided in the paragraphs above. We also consider that the (correct) removal of the short term analysis (as discussed in paragraph A13.41) does not have any bearing on the merits of the Modification.
Objections raised against CMP201 relevant to ACO (a)
A number of further objections have been raised during the Workgroup process suggesting that CMP201 will not better facilitate ACO (a). The main objections raised are:
BSUoS risk is asymmetric (between generators and suppliers) and this will result in an increased risk premium borne by end consumers; there will be windfall gains and losses between generators and suppliers; and A dislocation between BSUoS and RCRC will be created.
We provide our views on the objections noted in turn.
Asymmetric BSUoS risk – it has been suggested that the risk premium applied by generators is lower relative to that applied by suppliers. It has been suggested this is the case due to generators receiving a proportion of constraint payments that can then be used to hedge against BSUoS costs. This will then allow generators to levy a lower risk premium relative to a situation where they receive no constraint revenues. We do not believe this to be the case. This is primarily because generators cannot predict when and how much they will receive in constraint payments. In fact, some generators (for example nuclear power stations) are unlikely to receive any constraint income. No further evidence has been provided to substantiate the claim made that the BSUoS risk is asymmetric. As such we believe that the argument raised should be treated as nothing more than conjecture.
Windfall gains/losses – we agree that there is a risk that windfall gains and losses between generators and suppliers might occur. However, we view this as a transitional issue with the problem only crystallising if the change is implemented in haste. The Workgroup has therefore developed three solutions with differing implementation timescales to ensure that wholesale power contracts are executed to take into account changes to the BSUoS allocation. This will eliminate any windfall losses/gains.
Dislocate between RCRC and BSUoS – It has been suggested that if CMP201 is implemented then a potentially anomalous

	situation could occur where Parties are liable for RCRC charges/payments but are not liable for BSUoS charges/payments. This could give rise to the potential for windfall gains or losses by those Parties who would no longer be liable for BSUoS, due to the relationship between BSUoS and RCRC. If this is considered a problem we believe that P286 (which intends to remove RCRC from generation) will resolve this potentially anomalous situation. The RCRC argument should not be used to block the benefits that CMP201 delivers. Rather, P286 should be implemented in parallel with CMP201 to prevent any potentially perverse outcomes. Why not harmonise EU markets instead? - We note the opinion expressed and agree with the views provided in paragraphs 2.6 and 2.7 of the Report. Attempting to Harmonise EU markets would result in a significantly greater time period to facilitate the benefits of CMP201. As such CMP201 represents the more feasible option. In conclusion, we believe the points above demonstrate that CMP201 better meets ACO (a) and that the objections raised against the Modification have not been substantiated. ACO (c)
	We believe that CMP201 properly reflects National Grid's duty to develop its business by promoting a single internal electricity market. This will help facilitate efficient cross border trade. In addition, we note the main aims of the Third Package detailed in paragraph 4.32 of the Report. We believe these aims are entirely consistent with the intention of CMP201. For the reasons above we believe CMP201 better facilitates ACO
	(c).
What are your views on the implementation approaches proposed in the CMP201 Original and in the Workgroup	Our view on implementation approaches is unchanged from the previous Code Administrator Consultation. Therefore the reasoning provided in our previous Code Administrator Consultation response is also unchanged. For ease of reference we have reproduced the content of that response below:
Alternative CUSC Modifications?	The Original, WACM1 and WACM2 all better facilitate the achievement of the ACOs relative to the CUSC baseline (as they are essentially the same modification with only the implementation timescales differing). However, WACM1 best facilities the achievement of the ACOs compared with the other three options (including the CUSC baseline). This is because WACM1 provides the optimal notice period for market participants to react to the change to minimise any perverse outcomes which might distort competition. It also allows the benefits of the Modification to be achieved fully as soon as possible. Ultimately WACM1 maximises the benefits for consumers relative to the other options.
Do you have any other comments?	N/A

Respondent:	Tom Breckwoldt
	Tom.breckwoldt@gazprom-enery.com
Company Name:	Gazprom Marketing and Trading Retail Ltd ("Gazprom Energy")
Do you believe that CMP201 better facilitates the Applicable CUSC Objectives? Please include your reasoning.	We believe it is not clear that the CMP201 modification better facilitates the applicable CUSC objectives, in particular Applicable CUSC Objective A. (a) that compliance with the use of system charging methodology facilitates effective competition in the generation and supply of electricity and (so far as is consistent therewith) facilitates competition in the sale, distribution and purchase of electricity; While we acknowledge that the removal of BSUOS from generation will likely facilitate more effective competition in generation, we believe the change would inhibit competition in the supply of electricity. The change would impact most negatively on market participants on only one side of the market, who are not guaranteed the equivalent gain through their generation arm. Furthermore, we do not think that suppliers are in a better position to handle BSUoS costs, as suppliers are less able to manage/optimise their demand positions than generators, therefore it could have the effect of increasing overall costs, and consequently consumer bills. This risk is more pronounced for non-vertically integrated suppliers. More generally, we believe this increased liability for suppliers will be detrimental to the market through the increased risk for suppliers, increased barriers to entry and, at least in the short term, increased costs to GB consumers. Finally, we believe that these competition risks are heightened with the original modification implementation timeframes, which may lead to windfall gains or losses for parties with longer contracts.
What are your views on the implementation	If the modification is approved we feel it is imperative that a longer lead time is given with an implementation of at least 3 years (WACM1) or more preferably 5 years (WACM2). This will ensure that suppliers
approaches proposed in the CMP201 Original and in the Workgroup Alternative CUSC Modifications?	pricing more than 2 years (WACM2). This will ensure that suppliers pricing more than 2 years out can factor in increased BSUoS costs into contracts with customers. This will reduce the immediate risk to suppliers and customers.
Do you have any other comments?	No.

Respondent:	Paul Mott
Company Name:	EDF Energy
Do you believe that CMP201 better facilitates the Applicable CUSC Objectives? Please include your	EDF Energy believes that CMP201 better facilitates charging objective (a), than baseline. The reason is that generators overseas generally don't pay equivalent charges to BSUoS, and so enjoy a slight undue advantage over GB generators in baseline. CMP201 would level the playing field and remove this advantage, allowing generators either side of an interconnector to compete on a more even basis.
reasoning.	CMP201 neither better nor worse facilitates charging objective (b) – BSUoS will be just as cost-reflective as before, if CMP201 is passed.
	CMP201 is neutral against charging objective (c), as it does not relate to developments in transmission licensees' transmission businesses.
	We would note also that we consider CMP201 to be consistent with the spirit and intent of the Third Package, albeit that we certainly accept that it is not actually mandated by the Third Package.
	For reference, the Applicable CUSC Objectives are:
	(a) that compliance with the use of system charging methodology facilitates effective competition in the generation and supply of electricity and (so far as is consistent therewith) facilitates competition in the sale, distribution and purchase of electricity;
	(b) that compliance with the use of system charging methodology results in charges which reflect, as far as is reasonably practicable, the costs (excluding any payments between transmission licensees which are made under and in accordance with the STC) incurred by transmission licensees in their transmission businesses and which are compatible with standard condition C26 (Requirements of a connect and manage connection);
	(c) that, so far as is consistent with sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), the use of system charging methodology, as far as is reasonably practicable, properly takes account of the developments in transmission licensees' transmission businesses.

What are your views on the implementation approaches proposed in the CMP201 Original and in the Workgroup Alternative CUSC	Timescales for implementation need to take some account of existing contractual arrangements, where the forward trade horizon runs to about +2 years. A lead-in time beyond this appears to be inefficient and lacks clear justification. For this reason we support as ideal, the implementation timeframe that is embodied within the original, which gives between 2 and 3 years' notice of this change from the point of Ofgem's decision, depending on when that decision falls. If the decision were taken in September 2013 after a short impact assessment, this would lead to
Modifications?	implementation in April 2016 – quite a generous lead time. The alternatives do still have the same benefits against charging objectives (a) and (c) compared to baseline, however, as the original
Do you have any other comments?	No

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Our views have not changed from the original consultation, I attached below a copy of the response previously submitted

Simon Lord

Head of Transmission Services GDF SUEZ Energy UK-Europe



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Respondent:	Simon Lord
Company Name:	GDF-Suez
Please express your views regarding the Workgroup Consultation, including rationale. (Please include any issues, suggestions or queries)	We do not believe that either generation or supply is able to hedge BSUoS to any meaningful extent and the collection of BSUoS is simply a revenue recovery exercise. Therefore, the principle that should be applied is that the collection should optimise market efficiency. We believe that reducing barriers to cross border trading (removal of BSUoS from generation) will improve the overall competitiveness of the market.
Do you believe that the proposed original or any of the alternatives better facilitate the Applicable CUSC Objectives? Please include your reasoning.	Yes, we believe the proposal will bring the cost base of GB generation into line with that in continental Europe. Thus overall it will improve the efficiency of the GB market with the benefits of improved efficiency being felt by customers.
Do you support the proposed implementation approach? If not, please state why and provide an alternative suggestion where possible.	We support the proposed implementation approach with the proviso that there should be adequate notice to the market to ensure that there should be no windfall gains or losses across market players We believe that the notice period should be long enough to allow an orderly transition but not so long such that the benefit of the modification is not realised. A notice period of 36 month would allow the market to factor in any price changes.
Do you have any other comments?	No

Respondent:	James Anderson; james.anderson@scottishpower.com
	Tel: 0141 614 3006
Company Name:	ScottishPower Energy Management, ScottishPower Renewables
Do you believe that	For reference, the Applicable CUSC Objectives are:
CMP201 better facilitates the Applicable CUSC Objectives? Please	(a) that compliance with the use of system charging methodology facilitates effective competition in the generation and supply of electricity and (so far as is consistent therewith) facilitates competition in the sale, distribution and purchase of electricity;
include your reasoning.	CMP201 better facilitates effective competition in the generation of electricity both within GB and across Europe through removal of a barrier to trade.
	(b) that compliance with the use of system charging methodology results in charges which reflect, as far as is reasonably practicable, the costs (excluding any payments between transmission licensees which are made under and in accordance with the STC) incurred by transmission licensees in their transmission businesses and which are compatible with standard condition C26 (Requirements of a connect and manage connection);
	Implementation of CMP201 will be neutral in facilitating achievement of Objective (b). As in the existing baseline, the cost allocation methodology will continue to accurately reflect charges into the appropriate time periods but will neither improve nor weaken cost reflectivity.
	(c) that, so far as is consistent with sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), the use of system charging methodology, as far as is reasonably practicable, properly takes account of the developments in transmission licensees' transmission businesses.
	CMP202 will better reflect developments in the transmission licensees' businesses as it will take account of the increased interconnectivity between GB and continental Europe and the development of cross- border trading.

What are your views on the implementation approaches proposed in the CMP201 Original and in the Workgroup Alternative CUSC Modifications?	ScottishPower supports the implementation approach contained in the original proposal namely 2 years. This period will allow both suppliers and generators to reach the end of the majority of their contract positions thus minimising windfall gains and losses. Having a single transition date (rather than a phased introduction) will avoid the need for alternative trading products to be created (either including or excluding BSUoS) thus minimising the impact on participant systems
Do you have any other comments?	ScottishPower and ScottishPower Renewables support implementation of CMP201. Removal of BSUoS charges from generation will remove a barrier to cross-border trade with continental European counterparties. Now that the Authority has approved CMP202 (Removal of BSUoS from Interconnector lead parties), CMP201 should be implemented as soon as practicable. Not to implement CMP201 following implementation of CMP202 would place generators in GB at a commercial disadvantage to continental European generators who will not face BSUoS when selling into the GB market.

Respondent:	Colin-Prestwich@smartestenergy.com
Company Name:	SmartestEnergy
Do you believe that CMP201 better facilitates the Applicable CUSC Objectives? Please include your reasoning.	We originally stated the following: "We do not believe that this modification on its own facilitates effective competition or results in cost reflective charges. This is because the supply side is even less able to respond to price signals than the generation side. We believe that locational BSUoS would have been a welcome development in this regard. However, given that locational BSUoS has been rejected by Ofgem within the last couple of years and in the context of more recent European developments we are now of the opinion that the costs of constraints (a large component of BSUoS) are best dealt with by transferring the costs into the day ahead energy markets. "In summary, we would say that the proposals meet the CUSC objectives in part in combination with market coupling and we are not averse to its implementation." We have seen nothing to change this view.
What are your views on the implementation approaches proposed in the CMP201 Original and in the Workgroup Alternative CUSC Modifications?	The options now being presented are: a) Original – 1st April following 2 year after an Authority decision b) WACM1 – 1st April following 3 year after an Authority decision. c) WACM 2 – 1st April following 5 year after an Authority decision We were originally comfortable with the two year window as proposed in the original Modification report. The main proposal was stepped with two years' notice and this was adequate so we did not see the need for an alternative with three years' notice. We agreed with the workgroup that any alternatives with a phased approach may be overly complex. In short we support the original proposal of a 2 year lead time.
Do you have any other comments?	Notwithstanding any inconsistencies within the document the send- back process appears to be being used as a result of Ofgem being more reluctant to make decisions on principle. It is, in our view, not realistic to expect the working group to conduct "analysis that adequately explores how the quantified effect on competition might change over longer time." With regards to the definition of a generator it is absolutely essential that Scenario 2 (as described in the original Modification report under A9.34) is the scenario which is used for this change as it is the only one which ensures that the embedded benefits are unaffected and this proposal is not aimed at making any changes to embedded benefits.

Respondent:	Garth Graham (01738 456000 garth.graham@sse.com)
Company Name:	SSE
Do you believe that CMP201 better facilitates the Applicable CUSC Objectives? Please include your reasoning.	 For reference, the Applicable CUSC Objectives are: (a) that compliance with the use of system charging methodology facilitates effective competition in the generation and supply of electricity and (so far as is consistent therewith) facilitates competition in the sale, distribution and purchase of electricity;
	(b) that compliance with the use of system charging methodology results in charges which reflect, as far as is reasonably practicable, the costs (excluding any payments between transmission licensees which are made under and in accordance with the STC) incurred by transmission licensees in their transmission businesses and which are compatible with standard condition C26 (Requirements of a connect and manage connection);
	(c) that, so far as is consistent with sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), the use of system charging methodology, as far as is reasonably practicable, properly takes account of the developments in transmission licensees' transmission businesses.
	We have reviewed in detail the additional work requested by the Authority, as part of the 'send back' process, and undertaken by National Grid and the Workgroup, along with the update provided by the Workgroup.
	We concur with the latest (and previous) Workgroup conclusions, although our preference remains Original (as BEST). In addition we agree with the majority Workgroup view noted in paragraphs 1.11 and 1.12 (of Volume1).
	Having taking the additional information into account we continue to agree with the position, as regards CMP201 (Original and WACMs 1 and 2), that we set out in our response to the previous Code Administrator consultation in the autumn of 2012 - which we reproduce below.
	Yes. In our view CMP201 Original and WACMs 1 and 2 (as described in the Consultation Document) do better facilitate the Applicable Use of System Charging Methodology Objectives.
	In particular we concur, for the reasons set out in the Proposal and Consultation Document, that CMP201 Original and WACMs 1 and 2 better meet Objective (a) as they demonstrably facilitates effective competition in the generation and supply of electricity within GB and within the EU. However, of the three options set out in the Consultation Document

we believe that CMP201Original is BEST, followed by WACM 1 then
WACM 2.
This is because we believe that the benefits, in terms of better
meeting the Applicable Objectives, should be realised at the earliest
practical opportunity (i.e. ~ two years after an Authority decision)
rather than be delayed an extra ~ one year (with WACM 1) or ~ three
years (WACM 2).

What are your views on the implementation approaches proposed in the CMP201 Original and in the Workgroup Alternative CUSC Modifications?	We note the deliberations of the Workgroup with respect to implementation; and the very helpful development of two alternatives (WACMs 1 and 2) which offer alternative periods for implementation. Firstly, in our view, we agree with the proposed implementation approaches set out in section 6 of the consultation document for all three options. Secondly, for the reasons we set out above, we believe that CMP201 Original is the BEST option (followed by WACM 1 then WACM 2).
Do you have any other comments?	This particular Modification Proposal has brought forward some interesting and informative arguments for and against its approval, often from parties who have not engaged as fully in the CUSC change process as time would allow.
	There are strong arguments as to why the principle of this proposal (removing BSUoS from generation and applying (100%) to supply) is sound (and thus the change should be implemented). We have great sympathy with those arguments.
	The debate; as set out in the Workgroup report, Workgroup Consultation responses etc.; has raised key areas of concern.
	However, the focus has moved from whether this Modification should, in principle, be approved (in our view it should – for the reasons we set out previously and those shown in the Consultation Document) to one of the timescale for implementation (basically two, three or five years).
	In our view the benefits that arise from CMP201 should be realised at the earliest practical opportunity (namely the 1 st April following two years after an Authority decision – the Original) as this takes account of the overwhelming generation and supply contractual situation in GB whilst not delaying implementation to a 'long stop date' some five years later; as no evidence has been provided that parties will be materially affected if this change comes in sooner than this; i.e. two years with the Original.