GSR030 17 November 2023

Online Meeting via Teams



Modification Process

Code Modification Process Overview



Objectives and Timeline

Objectives for GSR030 Workgroup 5

- Review Actions and Outcomes
- Workgroup consultation review

Timeline for GSR030

Milestone	Date	Milestone	Date
Modification presented to Panel	09 November 2022	Workgroup Report Showstopper	TBC – possible mid-February
Workgroup Nominations (15 Working Days)	14 November 2022 to 09 December 2022	Workgroup Report – Submission to Panel	06 March 2024*
Workgroup 1 Proposer's presentation, check Terms of Reference, initial review of legal text	20 January 2023	Panel sign off that Workgroup Report has met its Terms of Reference	13 March 2024*
Workgroup 2 Bipole, anchor drag risk, N-1-1 criteria	07 March 2023	Code Administrator Consultation	26 March – 24 April 2024 (20 days CAC to allow for Easter)*
Workgroup 3 Scoping for cost benefit and impact assessment	18 May 2023	DFMR Submission to Panel	3 July 2024*
Workgroup 4 Refine solution(s) and materials to be provided with Workgroup Consultation	21 September 2023	DFMR Panel Vote	10 July 2024*
Workgroup 5 Finalise Workgroup Consultation document	17 November 2023	FMR to Ofgem	23 September 2024*
Workgroup Consultation	29 November – 13 December 2023	Ofgem decision	TBC
Workgroup 6 Discuss consultation responses, refine solution and legal text	16 January 2024	Implementation Date	TBC
Workgroup 7 Finalise Workgroup Report and Legal text	16 February 2024	*subject to confirmation of 2024 SQSS Panel dates. WG6 could take place w.c. 27 Nov 2023 if the WG is remore time needed over Christmas to complete actions, reduced to 15 days over Easter (extended to 20 days of	and CAC period could be

Actions

Action number	Workgroup Raised	Owner	Action	Comment	Due by	Status
9	WG2	MG	Provide detail on bipole / rigid bipole faults		WG5	Open
13	WG3	BA	A sentence should be added to an appropriate existing guidance note to ensure faults on metallic returns are addressed. Suggested sentence and suggested guidance note where this will sit to be provided		Ongoing	Open
15	4	National Grid	Review use of CBRA for cable installation to discuss at the next meeting	NA	19.10	Open
16	4	ВА	Send amended wording for the definitions slide from WG4 presentation		25.09	Open
17	4	ВА	Consider other possible impacting factors, such as compass deviation		29.09	Open
18	4	JG	Share slides from WG4 presentation (after checking for commercially sensitive information)		25.09	Closed
19	4	BA	Share overhead circuit risk tolerances, calculations and rationale behind what's deemed an acceptable level of risk (and relevance to cable scenarios)		29.09	Open
20	4	BA, FW	Compile text to cover ToR 3 - Consider retrospective impact on existing cables.		05.10	Open
21	4	LC	Consider what acceptable levels of risk are, what could be included in the SQSS & BA's suggested units involved for assessing risk		05.10	Open
22	4	NN, BA, LC	To discuss offline - risk and associated costs (investment in reinforcing the network and build/maintenance). BA to send a written narrative to help Orsted understand this ahead of a discussion		05.10	Open
23	4	All	Consider details of the above once shared and provide a proposal for discussion at the next WG		05.10	Open

Rationale behind the "order of magnitude less"??

The idea is that there are transmission system events that we secure by design and during operation (single circuit fault/double circuit fault/ busbar fault)

- secure by design but not necessarily during operation (switch fault)
- do not secure (simultaneous generation losses/ concurrent faults on multiple circuits except under certain conditions)

If we want to say that we should not secure the concurrent loss of two subsea cables sharing the same route we should ensure that the frequency of such event is comparable to that in category 3. However, because such events are rare and are not monitored, we would find it difficult to find such number. Alternatively, we if we prove that an event is significantly less likely (an order of magnitude less likely) than that in categories 1 and 2, we should be able to say that these are should not be secured neither by design nor during operation.

If we prove that an event is as likely to happen as an event in category 1 or 2, we would have to secure such event (i.e. by restricting the capacity of generation disconnected to 1800MW).

Workgroup Consultation

Terms of Reference

Terms of Reference

Workgroup Term of Reference	Location in Workgroup Report (to be completed at Workgroup Report stage)
If there is no reliability data available, consider alternative ways of assessing the risks and the benefits for the increase of the loss of infeed risk.	
Consider risk-based approach for the specification of any restriction on the loss of infeed risk associated with multiple cables sharing the same route.	
Consider retrospective impact on existing cables.	See Action 20

Any Other Business Teri Puddefoot – ESO Code Administrator

Next Steps Teri Puddefoot – ESO Code Administrator