Markets Forum 28th September 2022



Agenda

Time	Agenda
09:15-10:00	Arrival
10:00-10:05	Welcome
10.05-10.20	Introduction and welcome from Head of Markets
10:20-11:20	Short-term priorities: Approach to Winter 2022
11.20-11.35	Break
11:35-12:30	Medium-term priorities: Updates on new projects such as demand flexibility and upward firm regulating reserve
12:30-13:25	Lunch
13:25-14:10	Long-term priorities: Net Zero Market Reform
14.10-14.15	Close to online delegates.
14:25-16:00	Breakout Collaborative Sessions
16:15-16:45	Summary, Q&A and Close
17:00-18:30	Networking event



Net Zero Market Reform











- > What has changed since our May publication?
 - gas price and cost of living crisis
 - high priority short-term interventions to protect consumers, especially the most vulnerable, this winter
 - **GB long-term market reform** debate initiated (REMA and NZMR Phase 3)
 - Launch of Government's REMA consultation
 - Ofgem assessment on locational energy pricing; discussion/feedback on ESO NZMR Phase 3


Context

- Huge challenge of meeting net zero obligations remains:
 - Accelerated investment in low carbon resources required across the whole electricity system
 - Need vision for net zero power and long-term roadmap for net zero markets and policy
 - Must deliver system that is coordinated, efficient and secure, minimising costs and risks for consumers

This is why REMA is so important, and **our NZMR programme aims to support REMA** by recommending an optimal reform package(s) for net zero, and the pathway to getting there








Engagement with industry stakeholders and policymakers throughout

BEIS REMA consultation



nationalgridESO

Market Elements recap



Indicates option eliminated in Phase 2

New option added for Phase 3


Second Order Elements



- 7 Settlement Period Duration
- Ancillary Service Market Design



Context Recap Case for Shaping Next Change Packages Steps



Net Zero Market Reform Case for change

Key future needs

There is a need to manage dramatic energy imbalances with **flexible and firm technologies** across both supply and demand



There is a need to incentivise assets to **locate** and **dispatch** where they can minimise whole system costs



Operation case for change (phase 3)

We identified four key issues:

1. Constraint costs are rising at a dramatic rate

2. Balancing the network is becoming more challenging and requires increasing levels of inefficient redispatch

3. National pricing can sometimes send perverse incentives to flexible assets, that worsen constraints


4. Current market design does not unlock the full potential of flexibility from both supply and demand.



Case for change:

Update on case for change with focus on Investment elements of the assessment framework





In order to deliver the 2035 decarbonisation objective cost-effectively and without worsening system security issues we must:



- 1. Get the most efficient resource mix invested in the right place, entering/exiting service at the right time, but:
 - a. currently there is asymmetry in policy and market design; and
 - b. we are not sending the right locational signals.
- 2. Ensure all operational signals fully and accurately reflect system needs (internalise marginal costs and externalities operability, carbon), but:
 - a. market signals are insufficiently granular;
 - b. inconsistency in magnitude and targeting of signals through policy and markets; and
 - c. policy sometimes shields assets from system value signals or distorts signals.




As investment dramatically accelerates, asymmetry in market design and policies must be rebalanced to deliver a cost-optimal system.

- Need to better coordinate policy and derisking support across the whole system:
 - optimal ratio of variable renewables to flexibility
 - **implications** for networks, markets and wider system
 - symmetry of treatment between producers and consumers, supply / demand, e.g.:
 - **energy efficiency** not for market design to solve needs massive policy ambition rebalancing;
 - **demand response** impact demand-side opportunities
- Fuel switching (electrification) requires coherent carbon price signals across vectors

Huge investment needed but lower costs in scenarios with higher demand-side ambitions (e.g. below – Leading the Way)


Case for Change



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Long-term expectation of declining baseload wholesale prices reveals need to dramatically scale up flexibility

Baseload Power Price/ Total CfD Support (FES 2020 Leading the Way)






- Declining baseload wholesale prices expected under current market / policy arrangements:
 - more challenging for **merchant resources** to compete, increasing need for support
 - reduced investor confidence in future wholesale market
 - increasing payments to generators as the CfD top-up to strike price increases. Pass through of these costs to retail bills will dilute demand response incentives.
- Issues can be addressed over time through market / policy reforms that enable system value to be accurately revealed through prices.

Substantial whole-system efficiency savings can be realised from stronger locational siting incentives


- ~£81.5bn onshore & offshore transmission investment 2025 – 2050 (CSNP)
- Opportunity for substantial capacity to respond to stronger locational signals, reducing renewables' curtailment and network development costs/risks, and improving industrial competitiveness






Case

Regional flows on the electricity transmission network in Leading the Way



Current market signals (particularly the CM) do not reflect temporal requirements of the system




Note: Worse case week (15/01 to 22/01) based on 10 previous years weather data. Average excess, 21.3GW.



- CM designed around procuring sufficient capacity to meet highest estimated winter peak demand, with compensation targeting providers of that capacity.
- Sustained response, two-way response, ramping and other capabilities (and carbon intensity) increasingly needed for system security as duration/magnitude of supply/demand imbalances grows and net demand (not served by weather-dependent renewables) becomes more difficult to predict. Resources with these capabilities are under-rewarded by the CM for the value they provide.

Current market signals (particularly the CM) do not reflect temporal requirements of the system



 Ambitious, cost-effective and secure carbon reduction is dependent on growth and operation of flexible assets and efficient orderly exit of high-carbon plant


 Markets need to fairly and accurately reward low carbon flexible assets on both the demand and supply sides of the system so times of system stress can be precisely mitigated whenever and wherever they occur Dispatchable electricity supply sources to 2050

Case for Change

(Leading the Way)


NZMR Phase 3 - lack of temporal and locational granularity in current energy price signals means weak (sometimes perverse) incentives for supply and demand





Greater granularity of carbon signals would help drive low-carbon investment and flexibility

- UK ETS emissions cap covers several sectors that will decarbonise slower than power
- More low carbon capacity does not efficiently reduce emissions if renewables curtailed and redispatch is carbon-intensive. The carbon intensity of electricity that is both generated and consumed matters.
- Temporal carbon signal in market is relatively weak for some low-carbon resources, particularly those providing lowcarbon adequacy or flexible technologies.
- Consumers have poor visibility by time/location of actual carbon intensity of delivered/purchased electricity though consumer demand for 'green tariffs' is strong



Inconsistency in magnitude and targeting of signals through policy and markets

- Missing value for flex/adequacy in wholesale market while value in procurement mechanisms outside wholesale market inefficiently growing – CM, BM, Ancillary Services – and less accessible for DER/demand-side resources compared to wholesale market due to high transaction costs (right)
- The costs of these procurement mechanisms are passed to consumers via charges and levies, (e.g. BSUoS, CfD Supplier Obligation, CM Settlement Costs Levy), which in effect dampen price signals for accurate demand response
- Smart Export Guarantee for small generators (<5MW) does not accurately reflect system value and these small generators are not eligible for CfDs (auction eligibility starts from >5MW)



Wholesale market missing value for flex/adequacy (e.g. congestion): Distortions, missing marginal costs, externalities not internalised

More value can consequently and inefficiently end up in procurement mechanisms

But compared to the wholesale market, these procurement mechanisms are less accessible for small/distributed/demand-side resources

> **Restoring value** to wholesale market would bring efficiency and competition benefits

Policy sometimes shields assets from system value signals or distorts signals

Contract for Difference (CfD) design can distort system integration incentives

- CfD generators not incentivised to respond to low wholesale prices
- CfD value impacts incentive to participate, or changes bid behaviour, in BM/AS markets

Capacity Market (CM) can interact with spot markets in distorting ways

- Availability payments can impact spot market bids, dampening scarcity value and volatility in prices needed by flex
- Ex-ante de-rating factors averaged for location/time risk of inaccurate reward

Demand shielded from opportunity to respond to wholesale prices and consumers' price signals distorted

Packages

Case for

Change

- Slow implementation of enabling reforms e.g. MHHS
- Retail market issues: incentives for consumers/suppliers for demand response
- CM/AS/BM/CfDs as levies on retail bill - price signal issues for demand response


Shaping packages and next steps




Packages

Phase 4 Investment options assessment (topic of breakout session)

- Enhanced assessment criteria We have enhanced our assessment criteria
 - Broad categories remain the same, apart from one change to definition of security of supply
 - Sub-categories have been added which allows better scrutiny of our assessment decisions, building on feedback we received in Phase 3
- Assessment of different market design
 options using enhanced criteria
 - Analysed each in isolation
 - Considered how they could be combined to form a complementary package
- Construction of 6 coherent packages that we believe will meet vision and objectives to varying degree. Packages vary by:
 - Degree of locational signals through wholesale market; and
 - Deviation of design elements from minimum necessary, in order to achieve better outcomes / confidence





We will continue engagement with industry stakeholders and policymakers.



Close to online delegates

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