## **CUSC Panel**

26 October 2018

National Grid House, Gallows Hill,

Warwick



## Housekeeping

Fire alarms
Facilities
Red Lanyards



## **Introductions and Apologies**

#### **Apologies**

**None Received** 

**Observers** 

**Rachel Hinsley (Code Administrator)** 



# **Actions Log**





**BSUoS Charges** from Generation

Simon Vicary, EDF Energy

national**gridESO** 

# CMP308 Removal of BSUoS charges from Generation

26<sup>th</sup> October 2018





## Summary

- We are concerned about the current market arrangements not ensuring fair competition between GB and other interconnected countries so have been considering options for reform.
- We are considering raising a CUSC mod to only levy BSUoS on demand, i.e. reconsider CMP201 in the light of new evidence and changed circumstances, as other interconnected countries in general levy similar costs solely on demand.
- This is critical in the context of GB interconnection growth which is set to significantly increase (4GW today, 8GW by 2020 and, with Ofgem's approved pipeline, up to 18GW by early 2020s).
- Ofgem broadly supported CMP201 but considered the short-term consumer negative impact outweighed the longer term benefits:

"We consider that in principle, removing BSUoS from generators would have a small positive impact on competition. However, we are concerned that at this time the potential benefits this would bring would not be material enough to offset the potential costs to consumers from implementing the modification" - Ofgem decision Oct14

- NGET's calculations, on which Ofgem's decision was based, were that CMP201 would be detrimental
  to consumers but did not take into account the impact of CMP202 (Revised treatment of BSUoS
  charges for lead parties of Interconnector BM Units), so:
  - CMP201 modelling (for status quo) assumed BSUoS was split 50:50 between demand and generation.
  - As a result of CMP202 the G:D split for BSUoS charging in 2017 was around 49:51 and expected to be 47:53 by 2020.
  - This reduces the cost increase for suppliers to a value that is roughly equal to the reduction in GB wholesale prices.
- Our modelling indicates that this change will leave GB consumers neutral in the short term with the
  potential for longer term consumer benefits from competition.



**ENERGY** 

### Defect in current arrangements

- In our European trading partners and other interconnected countries the equivalent charges for balancing activities are more commonly paid entirely by suppliers.
  - As a result, the wholesale prices offered by generators in interconnected countries will not reflect these costs in the same way as those offered by a GB generator. (Our estimate is that GB generation is disadvantaged by the extra cost **~£600m in 2017**)
- Our proposal seeks to remove BSUoS charges from GB Generators, thereafter recovering all BSUoS from GB Suppliers. In doing so, it seeks to better facilitate efficient competition between GB generation and generation in other interconnected markets.
  - Better aligning the GB market arrangements and the charges faced by GB generation with those
    prevalent in other interconnected countries, where generation is typically not subject to such
    charges, allows GB and continental generation to compete on a more equitable basis and removes
    the potential for BSUoS to distort cross border trade.
  - **Supports the UK Industrial Strategy** for building a nation fit for the future with investment in skills, industries and infrastructure.
- The EU "Third Package" aims to deliver all consumers greater choice with more cross-border trade so as to achieve efficiency gains, competitive prices and security of supply.
  - It recognises that different market structures will exist, however it also acknowledges the need for fair competition across the European Community so as to provide producers with the **appropriate** incentives for investing in new generation.
  - Changing the GB arrangements as proposed thus facilitates the aims outlined in EU Directive 2009/72/EC concerning rules for the internal market in electricity.





## Consumer benefits of change

- The proposed CUSC mod better facilitates code objectives (a) effective competition, (c)
  developments in transmission business and (d) EU compliance. It is neutral on (b) cost
  reflectivity.
- Consumer cost impact
  - demand BSUoS will be less than double of current BSUoS £/MWh rates as interconnector flows to GB do not pay BSUoS (i.e. split of BSUoS between demand and generation is not currently 50:50), i.e. consumers neutral short term.
  - sufficient **lead time of 2 years** after a decision is made to ensure
    - wholesale market adjusts to the removal of BSUoS from generation.
    - time for consumers and suppliers to adjust for change.
  - **benefit of avoiding** the need to factor **BSUoS risk** into generation/wholesale market costs, instead being covered within more predictable demand volumes.
- In the **long run** removal of a distortion in the wholesale market will ensure more effective competition which is in **consumers' interests**: i.e. will ensure investment in new generation is more efficient.





## How does this BSUoS change fit with other reforms?

#### 1. Ofgem's RAFLC:

- Proposes National Grid review of BSUoS costs to confirm whether they are 'cost recovery' or contain pricing signals
- Grid to lead review outside of SCR
- Timescales tbc

#### 2. Ofgem's TCR:

- Considers addressing current BSUoS embedded benefit
- Impacts distribution connected generators
- Ofgem policy decision late
   2018; industry mod to follow
- Apr 2020+

# 3. EDF Energy's BSUoS mod:

- Proposes to recover BSUoS costs from demand; reducing production costs to zero
- Industry code process
- 6 months process with 2 year implementation period, i.e. April 2021







Affects <u>size of BSUoS</u> by potentially changing scope (e.g. could determine some elements are price signals)

Affects how BSUoS is charged (e.g. could change to gross volumetric impacting embedded benefits)

Affect who pays BSUoS (i.e. change demand recovery to 100%)

CMP250 fixes BSUoS charges for long period to provide certainty to users.

This change is independent of the 3 above but appears more sensible if demand pays 100% of BSUoS.


CMP281 proposes to exempt import or export BSUoS costs from storage assets; designed to align storage assets with generation

- These are 3 separate policy considerations which can be progressed in parallel.
- The conclusion of 1) may impact the BSUoS "pot" but is unlikely to change the scale of materiality and urgency.
- National Grid should undertake a targeted 6 month review of BSUoS elements (Oct-March) to support overall timescale for BSUoS reforms

### CMP201 Modelling revisited

- An assumption of CMP201 was that BSUoS charges were split 50:50 between production and demand.
- Following CMP202 the production volume from interconnection is no longer liable for BSUoS charges and thus this assumption no longer held
- This assumption affects the modelled consumer impacts in the short-term identified by National Grid's modelling
- Revising this assumption means that the consumer impacts in the short-term are close to neutral
- The longer term benefits from more effective competition will remain.

The case for change has grown since CMP201:					
	Interconnection (GW)	Interconnection volume (TWh)	BSUoS (£/MWh)		
CMP201 (2012)	3GW (2GW to mainland EU)	10	£1.51/MWh		
Now (2017)	4GW (3GW to mainland EU)	16	£2.48/MWh		
Future	c.8GW 2020 c.18GW early 2020s	30-70TWh (2021-2025) <sup>1</sup>	Growing		



¹- BEIS, Updated Energy & Emissions Projections 2017 (January 2018) – Figure 5.1 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/updated-energy-and-emissions-projections-2017





## **Next Steps:**

- 26<sup>th</sup> October 2018 CUSC Panel
- Q4 2018/Q1 2019 Workgroup
- H1 2019 Ofgem decision
- Implementation 2 years after Ofgem decision to give notice to market






## Appendix





## Change in interconnector flows since 2012








## **Historical BSUoS**









## Impact of BSUoS charged solely on GB demand

 Based on actual 2017 BSUoS data and modelling of interconnector flow changes the table below shows the estimated impact if BSUoS had been charged solely on GB demand.

	2017 Actual data	2017 with change implemented
Increase of GB generation due to proposed change (TWh)	0	2.1
GB chargeable BSUoS volume (TWh)	502.5	504.6
net imports (TWh)	15.7	13.6
Total GB demand (TWh)	259.1	259.1
BSUoS 2017 average (£/MWh)	2.48	2.46
Total BSUoS cost (£m)	1,243.9	1,243.9
BSUoS if charged 100% on demand (£/MWh)	4.80	4.80
Double current BSUoS rate (£/MWh)	4.95	4.95
Delta of BSUoS rate (£/MWh)	0.15	0.15
Minimum Wholesale Market fall to maintain status quo (£/MWh)	2.33	2.33
Consumer impact (£/MWh)		0.00
Consumer impact (£m)		0.0





#### **Embedded Generation**

 The impact on embedded generation of moving BSUoS recovery solely onto GB demand is expected to be neutral, as shown in the table below.

	£/MWh
BSUoS embedded benefit increase	2.33
Wholesale Market decrease*	2.33
Net Embedded Generator impact	0.00







# In Flight Modifications

Joseph Henry, Code Administrator Representative



#### CMP280 and CMP281

#### **Developments Since Last Panel**

- CMP281 is out for Workgroup Consultation Input by 12 November 2018
- 3 workgroups to be held in w/c 12,19 and 26 November to make up for lost time

Modification Description: CMP280: The Modification aims to remove liability from Generator and Storage Parties for the Demand Residual element of the TNUoS tariff.

CMP281: The Modification aims to remove liability from storage facilities for Balancing Services Use of System (BSUoS) charges on imports.

#### **Developments Since Last Panel**

- Workgroup Meeting Held 25 October 2018
- 10 WACMs raised

Modification Description: CMP285 - This modification seeks to reform CUSC governance to enhance the independence and diversity of Panel members and ensure wider engagement from CUSC signatories.

#### CMP286 and CMP287

#### **Developments Since Last Panel**

- Workgroup last held 17 September
- Workgroup finalised W/G Consultation
- Workgroup Consultation to be published by Code Administrator on 31 October 2018 for 15 Working Days
- Workgroup to be held in December
- The Code Administrator request a three month extension report was due back today after extension granted at April's Panel (Minute 7360)

Modification Description: CMP286 - This modification seeks to improve the predictability of TNUoS demand charges by bringing forward the date at which the target revenue used in TNUoS tariff setting is fixed to allow customer prices to more accurately reflect final TNUoS rates.

CMP287: Seeks to improve the predictability of TNUoS demand charges by bringing forward the date at which certain parameters used in TNUoS tariff setting (such as demand forecasts) are fixed to allow customer prices to more accurately reflect final TNUoS rates

#### **CMP288** and **CMP289**

#### **Developments Since Last Panel**

- Code Administrator to hold Webex in order publish Workgroup Consultation within next 5 working days
- An extension of 1 month is requested. Workgroup Report due back for December based on current timelines.

Modification Description: CMP288 - This modification seeks to introduce explicit charging arrangements to recover additional costs incurred by Transmission Owners and TNUoS liable parties as a result of transmission works undertaken early due to a User initiated delay to the Completion Date of the works, or to facilitate a backfeed

CMP289: Seeks to introduce changes to non-charging sections of the CUSC to support the introduction of explicit charging arrangements to recover additional costs incurred by Transmission Owners and TNUoS liable parties as a result of transmission works undertaken early due to a User initiated delay to the Completion Date of the works, or to facilitate a backfeed. The changes to the charging element of the CUSC are covered under CMP288.

#### **Developments Since Last Panel**

- 2<sup>nd</sup> Workgroup to be held over 2 days with GC0117 on 11 October 2018
- Next Workgroup TBC in November

Modification Description: CMP291 - This modification seeks to introduce The open, transparent, non discriminatory and timely publication of the harmonised rules for grid connection (in accordance with the RfG, DCC and HVDC) and the harmonised rules on system operation (in accordance with the SOGL) set out within the Bilateral Agreement(s) exhibited in the CUSC.

This modification will set out within the CUSC the obligations in the EU Connection Network Codes and System Operation Guideline as they relate to the harmonised rules for connection and system operation in GB

#### **Developments Since Last Panel**

- 1st Workgroup due to be held on 02 October 2018 postponed due to lack of quoracy
- Doodle poll sent out to ascertain availability for working groups to be sent 26
   October 2018
- Workgroup report due for January 2019. Extension may be asked for at next Panel.

CMP292 - The purpose of this modification is to ensure that the charging methodologies (all Charging Methodologies as defined in the CUSC) are fixed in advance of the relevant Charging Year to allow The Company – as Electricity System Operator - to appropriately set and forecast charges. Introducing a cut-off date for changes to the methodologies will help to reduce the risk of charges out-turning differently to the forecasts produced by the Company and created by Users.

#### CMP293 and CMP294

#### **Developments Since Last Panel**

• CMP293 and CMP294 will be sent to the Authority for decision in line with Legal Separation changes from other codes, as per the request of the Authority.

Modification Description: CMP293 - This proposal seeks to modify the CUSC to reflect the creation of a new National Grid Electricity System Operator (NGESO) that is legally separated from National Grid Electricity Transmission Limited (NGET). The specific CUSC references have been updated in order to ensure the System Operator and Transmission Owner obligations are clear.

CMP294: This proposal seeks to modify the CUSC to reflect the creation of a new National Grid Electricity System Operator (NGESO) that is legally separated from National Grid Electricity Transmission Limited (NGET). The specific CUSC references have been updated in order to ensure the System Operator and Transmission Owner obligations are clear

#### **Developments Since Last Panel**

- 1st Workgroup held on 17 October 2018
- Positive progress made, second workgroup planned for early December
- The Code Administrator would like to ask panel for a 2 month extension today,
   Workgroup Report was initially due for December (As agreed at May's Panel)

CMP295: Under BSC P344 and GC0097, and future market arrangements, an aggregator will combine the export capabilities of SVA-registered embedded generation to participate in the BM. In order to facilitate Grid Code compliance, and to ensure appropriate rights/obligations for Virtual Lead Parties (as to be defined in BSC P344), accession to the CUSC is necessary and entry into specific CUSC contracts is required.

#### CMP296 and CMP297

#### **Developments Since Last Panel**

- CMP296 and CMP297 are awaiting Authority Decision
- Modifications were sent to Ofgem in July 2018

Modification Description: CMP296- P344 introduces a new class of BMU, and a new class of BMU registrant to the BSC ("Virtual Lead Parties"); it is necessary to amend the CUSC to expand the BSUoS exemption to these Virtual Lead Parties

CMP297: This proposal seeks to alter Section 14 of the CUSC such that the extant BSUoS exemption which applies to Interconnector BMUs can be expanded to cover Virtual Lead Parties. This consequential CMP seeks to amend Section 11 to introduce a definition of 'Virtual Lead Party'

#### **Developments Since Last Panel**

- 1st Workgroup held 02 October 2018
- 2<sup>nd</sup> workgroup date TBC, to be held in November

Modification Description: CMP298 - Due to increasing levels of embedded generation connections the process for assessing their overall impact on the transmission system needs to be revised allowing the System Operator to recognise the changes caused by multiple small scale connections and plan accordingly.

#### **Developments Since Last Panel**

Modification on hold until December as per Panel decision

Modification Description: CMP300 - To ensure that the Response Energy Payment paid to or by generators with respect to a BM Unit with low or negative marginal costs is reflective of the cost or avoided cost of energy production.

#### **Developments Since Last Panel**

- CMP301 is with the Authority for Decision
- This was sent to the Authority on 8 August 2018

Modification Description: CMP301 – CMP213 introduced specific expansion factors for HVDC and subsea circuits however the existing legal text is open to interpretation – this proposal would cement the interpretation made by The Company to ensure consistency with onshore circuits

#### **Developments Since Last Panel**

 Workgroups 2 and 3 will be held in Glasgow due to geographic proximity to vast majority of Workgroup members on 29 and 30 October 2018

Modification Description: This modification seeks to make part of the TNUoS charge more cost-reflective through removal of additional costs from local circuit expansion factors that are incurred beyond the connected, or to-be-connected, generation developers' need.

#### **Developments Since Last Panel**

- Initial Start Off Meeting held 27 September 2018
- 1st WG to be arranged in early November 2018

Modification Description: CMP304 looks to improve the Enhanced Reactive Power Service, making it "fit for purpose"

#### **Developments Since Last Panel**

Code Administrator Consultation closes today at 5pm

Modification Description: CMP305 looks to remove the Enhanced Reactive Power Service

## **CMP306**

## **Developments Since Last Panel**

- Workgroup members being sourced
- Kick off meeting to be held in November

Modification Description: CMP306 The purpose of this modification is to align the rate of return applied to the net asset value of connection points in the calculation of annual connection charges (as set out at paragraph 14.3.21 of the Connection Charging Methodology) to the pre-tax cost of capital in the price control of the Relevant Transmission Licensee (plus a margin of 1.5 percentage points in the case of MEA-linked assets). This will improve the cost reflectivity of the charges, since the return on capital will equal the Authority's most recent assessment of that cost for the Relevant Transmission Licensee.

## nationalgrid

## **CUSC Modifications**

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CMP251 - Remove error margin cap on TNUoS compliance with EU (British Gas)


WG - Workgroup

ConS - Consultation

WG ConC – Workgroup Conclusion
CA – Code Administrator Consultation

DRMR - Draft Final Modification

Report





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
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
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
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
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John Twomey, National Grid ESO



## **Code Administrator Code of Practice Survey Results**

## **Comparison Grid Code 2017 and 2018 results**

	Results 2017	Results 2018	Change
Perceived improvements			
Net improved %	-	20	Increase 20%
Net worsened %	-	6	Increase 6 %
Overall satisfaction			
Net satisfied %	59	66	Increase 7%
Net dissatisfied %	7	6	Decrease 1%
Satisfaction with the provision of			
support	67	73	Increase 6%
Net satisfied % Net dissatisfied %	8	6	Decrease 2%
Satisfaction with support received			
when requested	69	77	Increase 8%
Net satisfied % Net dissatisfied %	4	0	Decrease 4%

## **Code Administrator Code of Practice Survey Results**

#### **Comparison Grid Code 2017 and 2018 results**

	Results 2017	Results 2018	Change
Kept informed about the code			
Net informed %	81	80	Decrease 1%
Net not informed %	19	14	Decrease 5%
Ease of interpreting information from			
the Code Administrator	52	60	Increase 8%
Net easy %	26	14	Decrease 12 %
Net difficult %	20	17	Decircase 12 70
Relevance of information			
Net relevant %	92	83	Decrease 9%
Net not relevant %	8	10	Increase 2%
Understanding modifications			
Net satisfied %	44	54	Increase 10%
Net dissatisfied %	19	6	Decrease 13%

## What does our service transition look like?

- Our 'Customer Journey' Project will enhance the current service we provide in RIIO-T1.
- We believe there is an opportunity to further increase performance and unlock consumer value through Code Management – however the role of a Code Manager remains unclear at this point in time.
- We would welcome your views on our indicative views for the role of a Code Manager in RIIO-2.

#### **Code Administration**

CACoP Compliance
A Good Critical Friend
Limited scope to raise Modifications
Limited Strategic Code Change
Reactive Stakeholder Engagement
Limited Use of Tools and Technology
Limited Innovation
Limited Prioritisation Capability
Limited Consumer Value Objective



## Code Management\*

CACoP Compliance and Improvement
A Better Critical Friend
Wider scope to raise Modifications
More Strategic Code Change
Proactive Stakeholder Engagement
Greater Use of Tools and Technology
Driving Innovation e.g. Code Simplification
Greater Prioritisation Capability
Stronger Consumer Value Objective

#### **Questions**

- Does this define the high level principles of a code manager?
- 2. Who do you think is best placed to undertake this role?



## Funding model options for a Code Manager?

Margin based funding Incentive based outcomes
 Fixed Funding for the duration of the price control i.e. 5 years
 Annual funding process
 Industry Stakeholder Consultation on outputs / deliverables
 Panel / Ofgem Approval process?

#### **Questions**

- 1. For each of the above areas what are your views?
- 2. Are there any other important principles we need to capture?

Panel role in allocating resources /

budget

## Relevant Interruptions Claim Report

**Shazia Akhtar, Code Administrator** 





**Standing Groups** 

national**gridESO** 



# **Industry Updates**



