

# STCP 09-2 Issue 0065 Public and Site Safety

## STC Procedure Document Authorisation

Party	Name of Party Representative	Signature	Date
<u>National Grid Electricity System Operator Ltd</u>			
National Grid Electricity Transmission plc			
SP Transmission Ltd			
Scottish Hydro-Electric Transmission Ltd			
Offshore Transmission Owners			

## STC Procedure Change Control History

Issue 001	09/12/2004	BETTA Go-Live Version
Issue 002	04/07/2005	Issue 002 incorporating PA023
Issue 003	05/10/2005	Incorporating PA036 and PA037
Issue 004	13/01/2006	Incorporating PA040
Issue 005	24/06/2009	Issue 005 incorporating changes for Offshore Transmission
<u>Issue 006</u>	<u>01/04/2019</u>	<u>Issue 006 incorporating changes for National Grid Legal Separation</u>

## 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Scope

1.1.1 This procedure applies to ~~NGET~~NGESO and each TO and describes the processes required to be established by ~~NGET~~NGESO and each TO:

- to maintain public and site safety on a TO's Transmission System; and
- to ensure appropriate actions are taken in response to safety information received regarding a TO's Transmission System.

1.1.2 The following are outside the scope of this document:

- the application of safety measures for TO circuits released from service by a Transmission Status Certificate, which rests with the relevant TO and Users; and
- the arrangements necessary between ~~NGET~~NGESO and each TO to ensure the User compliance regarding safety matters, including Users' Grid Code obligations.

1.1.3 ~~NGET~~NGESO and each TO recognise that safety is of paramount importance and that all decisions and actions shall be taken in light of this.

1.1.4 For the purposes of this document, the TOs are:

- ~~NGET~~;
- SPT; and
- SHETL
- All Offshore Transmission Licence holders as appointed by OFGEM

In the event that specific conditions or exceptions are made in the document relating to an Onshore TO or Offshore TO these will be prefixed appropriately.

## 1.2 Objectives

1.2.1 The objective of STCP 09-2 is to outline the roles and responsibilities of ~~NGET~~NGESO and each TO for the management of public and site safety, including those required for:

- safeguarding life;
- communications with the public;
- communications with the emergency services;
- communications with TO staff and contractors;
- re-energisation policy;
- site safety;
- potential switchgear over-stressing; and
- the number of circuit breaker operations permissible before maintenance.

## 2 Key Definitions

### 2.1 For the purposes of STCP09-2 (Public and Site Safety):

2.1.1 **Event** and **Safety Rules** are as defined in the Grid Code as at the Code Effective Date and for the purposes of this STCP only, not as defined in the STC.

### **3 Public and Site Safety**

#### **3.1 Safeguarding Life**

- 3.1.1 Upon receipt of a communication concerning site or public safety within their licensed area, a TO shall follow its risk assessment processes, operational procedures and guidelines to decide and, where appropriate, implement actions required to ensure and/or maintain acceptable levels of safety as far as reasonably practicable.
- 3.1.2 When immediate action is required to safeguard life, Plant and/or Apparatus a TO may de-energise the necessary Plant and/or Apparatus without reference to ~~NGETNGESO~~ or Users even if the de-energisation of such Plant and/or Apparatus will result in the loss of generation and/or Demand.
- 3.1.3 When requested by a User to carry out an immediate action to de-energise User controlled plant in order to safeguard life, Plant and/or Apparatus a TO may operate the necessary Plant and/or Apparatus without reference to ~~NGETNGESO~~ or another User even if the de-energisation of such Plant and/or Apparatus will result in the loss of generation and/or Demand.
- 3.1.4 Where any actions identified pursuant to section 3.1.2 or 3.1.3 would, if implemented, result in the TO's Transmission System operating outside of the relevant security standards, then the TO shall wherever practicable, liaise with ~~NGETNGESO~~ as part of the risk assessment process before implementing such actions. The risk assessment process should take into account the potential wider safety and system impacts of these actions. For the avoidance of doubt, this does not preclude the TO from switching TO Plant and/or Apparatus out of service in order to safeguard life, Plant and/or Apparatus without the agreement of ~~NGETNGESO~~.
- 3.1.5 A TO shall contact ~~NGETNGESO~~ without delay following any actions taken pursuant to section 3.1.2, section 3.1.3 or section 3.1.4. Once contact is established with ~~NGETNGESO~~, the TO shall inform ~~NGETNGESO~~ of the relevant Event(s) and any actions taken pursuant to section 3.1.2, section 3.1.3 or section 3.1.4. ~~NGETNGESO~~ and the TO shall then agree any further post Event actions where appropriate. Following such consultation between ~~NGETNGESO~~ and the TO, ~~NGETNGESO~~ shall be responsible for any post Event liaison with Users, where appropriate, regarding the actions taken pursuant to section 3.1.2, section 3.1.3 or section 3.1.4.
- 3.1.6 Where time allows liaison shall take place between a TO and ~~NGETNGESO~~ to discuss and agree any actions on that TO's Transmission System required to safeguard life, Plant or Apparatus. Such agreed actions shall be implemented in accordance with STCP 01-1: Operational Switching. ~~NGETNGESO~~ will be responsible for liaising with User(s), where applicable and where time allows, to mitigate the impact of any such actions upon User(s), before any release of TO Plant and/or Apparatus from operational service pursuant to this section 3.1.6.

#### **3.2 Communications**

- 3.2.1 Each TO is responsible for the management of all communications regarding public and site safety on the TO's Transmission System between that TO and members of the public, the emergency services and local authorities. All public emergency calls shall be directed to the relevant TO call centre or TO control room as appropriate.

3.2.2 When ~~NGE~~~~NGESO~~ receives information that may have site or public safety implications on a TO's Transmission System, ~~NGE~~~~NGESO~~ shall advise the relevant TO immediately. For the avoidance of doubt, the relevant TO shall be responsible for the management of further communications where required regarding site or public safety following the notification of information pursuant to this section 3.2.2 by ~~NGE~~~~NGESO~~ to the relevant TO.

3.2.3 When a TO receives information that may have site or public safety implications on another TO's Transmission System, the TO shall advise the other TO immediately. For the avoidance of doubt, the TO that owns the TO's Transmission System impacted by the information relating to site or public safety shall be responsible for the management of further communications where required regarding site or public safety following the notification of information pursuant to this section 3.2.3 by a TO to the other TO.

### 3.3 Re-energisation Policy

3.3.1 Following the automatic or manual de-energisation of a TO's Plant and/or Apparatus the TO shall assess and determine the availability of such Plant and/or Apparatus in accordance with the relevant TO policy and procedures. These TO policies and procedures are outlined in Appendix A of STCP 02-1: Alarm Event and Fault Management. ~~In applying these policies/procedures t~~~~The NGESO, if requested will~~  
~~shall, provide guidance to the TO as to the risks and implications to the wider system~~  
~~of the circuit remaining out of service.~~

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3.3.2 When the TO determines that such de-energised Plant and/or Apparatus is available for re-energisation the TO shall inform ~~NGE~~~~NGESO~~ as soon as reasonably practicable in accordance with STCP 02-1 Alarm and Event Management and STCP 04-4 Provision of Asset Operational Information.

### 3.4 Site Safety

3.4.1 All site safety issues other than those contained within STC Section C, Part One, Paragraph 6 are the responsibility of each TO. Such site safety issues for which each TO is responsible include, but are not limited to:

- Safety Rules;
- procedures relating to site safety issues;
- authorisations; and
- site access restrictions.

3.4.2 Each TO shall notify ~~NGE~~~~NGESO~~, of all relevant safety bulletins, technical limitations, operational restrictions, special network arrangements or any other related document as appropriate at each site. ~~NGE~~~~NGESO~~ and each TO shall ensure compliance with these notifications in the planning and instruction of actions in accordance with STCP 01-1: Operational Switching.

3.4.3 ~~NGE~~~~NGESO~~ shall be responsible for ensuring that the National Electricity Transmission System is operated in such a way that Plant and Apparatus is not operated or potentially (with respect to licence security standards) operated outside its TO specified (normal & enhanced capability) rating. The TO will support this process through the provision of the Services Capability Specification, changes to the Operational Capability Limits and other operational information known to the TO and agreed as relevant with ~~NGE~~~~NGESO~~.

### 3.5 Switchgear

- | 3.5.1 NGETNGESO shall inform the relevant TO of any User's permanent or temporary permission to operate that User's switchgear in excess of its specified normal or enhanced capability rating as appropriate and of any restrictions or safety bulletins that shall be applied when operating that User's switchgear in excess of its specified normal or enhanced capability rating.

### **3.6 Management of Fault Levels**


- 3.6.1 In assessing compliance of fault levels against the fault capabilities of breakers and substations the following conditions apply
- | 3.6.2 NGETNGESO shall use Good Industry Practice in creating and running fault level studies in respect of the expected maximum fault levels on each TO Transmission System. These studies shall be carried out at least daily. The studies shall also be updated (applying Good Industry Practice) by NGETNGESO whenever the condition of, or the running arrangements of the National Electricity Transmission System have changed such that the previous expected maximum fault levels on a TO Transmission System are no longer valid.
- | 3.6.3 NGETNGESO shall share the results of a daily peak study for each TO's Transmission System on a daily basis with the relevant TO. NGETNGESO shall also share the results of any updated study whenever reasonably requested by a TO. Sharing of results will provide each TO with NGETNGESO's expectation of fault levels and enable comparison with the TO's own fault level calculations.
- | 3.6.4 Under these conditions, the Parties agree that NGETNGESO shall be compliant with the requirement to operate each TO's Transmission System within the technical limits of the Site Capability Specification (SCS) and any relevant OCLs in respect of fault levels provided that the results of these studies show that Transmission System is being operated such that the fault levels are less than 100% of the relevant technical limits. If comparison of the NGETNGESO results and a TO's calculations cause the TO concern, then the TO will explicitly submit OCLs for fault capability with an appropriate safety margin, until such concerns are mutually resolved.


### **3.7 Circuit Breaker Operations**


- | 3.7.1 The TO shall monitor the number of circuit breaker operations and use reasonable endeavours to advise NGETNGESO of any circuit breaker that is approaching the maximum number of circuit breaker operations. An overview of the TO policies and procedures used to manage this process is contained within Appendix B of STCP 02-1: Alarm and Event Management.
- | 3.7.2 To increase the number of permissible operations above the advised maximum level of circuit breaker operations, NGETNGESO must request and be granted permission from the relevant TO. A record of such agreement shall be logged by NGETNGESO and the relevant TO.

## Appendix A: Process Diagrams

Note that the Process Diagrams shown in this Appendix A are for information only. In the event of any contradiction between the process represented in this Appendix and the process described elsewhere in this STCP, then the text elsewhere in this STCP shall prevail.









## **Appendix B: Abbreviations & Definitions**

### **Abbreviations**

<a href="#">NGET</a>	<a href="#">National Grid Electricity Transmission</a>
SPT	SP Transmission Ltd
SHETL	Scottish Hydro Electric Transmission Ltd
TO	Transmission Owner

### **Definitions**

#### **STC definitions used:**

Apparatus

Code Effective Date

[NGESO](#)

[NGET](#)

Operational Capability Limits (OCL)

Plant

Services Capability Specifications (SCS)

Transmission System

Users

#### **Grid Code definitions used:**

Demand

Event

Safety Rules

#### **Definition used from other STCPs:**

Transmission Status Certificate

STCP 01-1 Operational Switching